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THE ECONOMICS OF DEAL RISK: ALLOCATING RISK




In any large corporate acquisition, there is an interim period
between the time that the parties enter into a merger agreement and
the time the transaction is effected and the purchase price paid.
During this period, the business of the acquired company may
deteriorate, thus raising the question of whether the counterparty
must perform on the agreement and pay the purchase price. Merger
agreements typically address this problem through “material adverse
change” (MAC) clauses, which provide that a party may walk away
from the transaction without penalty if the counterparty has suffered
a MAC. Although the definition of MAC is usually very complex and
intensely negotiated, when a company’s business has deteriorated
between the signing and closing of a deal, the parties will often
disagree about whether the impairment amounts to a MAC within
the meaning of the agreement. MAC clauses have thus given rise to
more litigation than any other provision of merger agreements, and
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the amounts in controversy in such cases have often been spectacular.
With the fate of transactions worth tens of billions of dollars turning
on the proper interpretation of MAC clauses, the economic function-
ing of MAC clauses is therefore crucially important to the market for
corporate control.
MAC clauses usually identify various kinds of risks to the com-
pany’s business that may arise during the interim period and assign
some of those risks to one party and some to the other. The economic
theory of contract law suggests that such allocations will be efficient;
for example, that risks will be assigned to cheaper cost avoiders or
superior risk bearers. In order to investigate the efficient allocation
of risk under MAC clauses, this Article reports the results of an
empirical study of MAC clauses in 353 transactions involving public
companies in the United States announced between July 1, 2007, and
June 30, 2008, classifying such transactions by the form of consider-
ation paid (i.e., cash, stock, or a mix of both).
On the basis of this study, this Article identifies four kinds of risks
typically allocated in MAC clauses: (a) systematic risks, such as
broad economic or market factors affecting firms generally; (b)
indicator risks, which are risks that the company in question will not
meet predetermined measures of its financial performance, such as
internal projections or estimates by industry analysts; (c) agreement
risks, such as attrition of employees or loss of customers arising from
the announcement of the agreement; and (d) business risks, the kinds
of risks that arise in the ordinary course of the company’s operations,
such as large environment liabilities for a petroleum company. The
study shows that in both cash mergers, and stock-for-stock and cash-
and-stock transactions, although business risks are allocated to the
party itself, systematic risks and agreement risks are generally
allocated to the contractual counterparty. Although indicator risks
more often than not stay with the party itself, they are shifted to the
counterparty in a significant minority of agreements.
The allocation of business risks to the party itself is readily
explicable in terms of the party being either the cheaper cost avoider
or superior risk bearer of such risks. The efficient allocation of
systematic risks to counterparties, however, turns out to be very
difficult to explain. In particular, in both stock-for-stock and cash-
and-stock mergers, MAC clauses usually contain reciprocal provi-
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sions that shift systematic risks between the parties so that, during
the interim period, parties often bear each other’s systematic risks.
Neither party can plausibly be thought to be the cheaper cost avoider
or superior risk bearer with respect to such risks of the other party,
especially when the risks of very large acquirers are shifted to
relatively small targets. This risk-swapping phenomenon thus
requires another explanation.
The solution lies in realizing that, when MAC clauses allocate
systematic risks to the counterparty, the party is relieved not only of
the systematic risk itself but also of an additional but related risk:
namely, the risk that the counterparty will declare (either honestly or
opportunistically) that the party has been MAC’d by the materializa-
tion of the risk. This additional risk is significant because it is much
worse for a party to be declared MAC’d by its counterparty on the
basis of a materializing risk than just to suffer the materialization
of that risk. A public dispute about whether the company has been
MAC’d exacerbates the disruption of its business that the pending
transaction has already caused; imperils its relations with employ-
ees, customers, creditors, and others with whom it does business;
publicly releases negative information about the company that
otherwise would have remained confidential; exposes the company to
disparagement by the counterparty; and, if the dispute is litigated,
can even lead to a public certification by a court that the company is,
in effect, damaged goods. All of these additional risks can be
completely eliminated by shifting the underlying systematic risk to
the counterparty. With the counterparty bearing the risk, it has no
incentive to declare a MAC based on the materialization of the risk.
The allocation of such risks in typical MAC clauses is thus efficient,
not because the risks being shifted in such clauses can be borne more
efficiently by the parties to whom they are shifted, but because, in the
act of shifting them, different but related risks arising from the
acquisition process itself are being eliminated. The shifting of
agreement and indicator risks, though not entirely parallel, can be
explained in related ways.
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1. Lou R. Kling, Eileen Nugent Simon & Michael Goldman, Summary of Acquisition
Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 781 (1997).
2. Although the phrase “material adverse effect” (MAE) is more commonly used in
merger agreements, MAC and MAE are generally understood to be synonymous. I shall use
“MAC” throughout. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral
Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 330-31 n.3 (2005) (treating MAC and MAE
as equivalent and using MAC throughout); Rod J. Howard, Deal Risk, Announcement Risk
and Interim Changes—Allocating Risk in Recent Technology M&A Agreements, in DRAFTING
CORPORATE AGREEMENTS, 2000-2001, at 221, 224-45 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. B-1219, 2000) (stating that “[o]ften the difference [between MAC and
MAE] is merely a choice of shorthand terminology, and the definitions are identical or
indistinguishable,” but noting that clever litigators may attempt to find, ex post, a difference
in meaning); see also Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal-Usage Analysis of “Material Adverse
Change” Provisions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 17-20 (2004) (arguing that “MAC” is
preferable to “MAE” for technical reasons in drafting of agreements). But see Arthur H.
Rosenbloom & Jeffrey Mann, Liability Issues in the Interpretation of Material Adverse
Change/Material Adverse Effect Clauses, ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS & DIRS. LIAB. LITIG. REP.,
July 16, 2001, at 15 n.5 (offering a technical distinction between “material adverse change”
and “material adverse effect”).
3. For example, in the $25 billion leveraged buyout of Sallie Mae by J.C. Flowers,
Flowers declared a MAC and Sallie Mae sued to enforce the deal. Andrew Ross Sorkin &
Michael J. de la Merced, Sallie Mae Settles Suit Over Buyout That Fizzled, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2008, at C1. The litigation was later settled on terms favorable to Flowers. Id. In the $27
billion acquisition of Guidant by Johnson & Johnson, after Johnson & Johnson declared a
MAC, the parties settled the litigation before trial and agreed upon a reduced purchase price
INTRODUCTION
In the acquisition of any large business, various corporate and
regulatory reasons require that there be an interim period between
the date on which the parties enter into a merger agreement (the
signing) and the date on which the purchase price is paid and the
ownership of the business is transferred (the closing).1 Between
signing and closing, the business or financial condition of the
company being acquired may deteriorate. Merger agreements
typically address this problem through complex and highly-negoti-
ated “material adverse change” or “MAC” clauses,2 which provide
that, if a party has suffered a MAC within the meaning of the
agreement, the counterparty can costlessly cancel the deal. Parties
to merger agreements have often disagreed about whether one of
them has suffered a MAC, and so MAC clauses have resulted in
litigation in which tremendous sums of money, sometimes tens of
billions of dollars, are at stake.3
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(though Boston Scientific later made a topping offer for Guidant). Scott Hensley & Thomas
M. Burton, J&J, Guidant Skip Courtroom, Set Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at A3. The
most important MAC disputes litigated to conclusion include the following: In re IBP, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 23, 67-69 (Del. Ch. 2001) (explaining how Tyson declared a MAC
on IBP, and that IBP successfully sued to specifically enforce the merger agreement in a $3.2
billion transaction); David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyson to Acquire IBP in $3.2
Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2001, at 13 (stating the estimated amount of the deal to be
$3.2 billion); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 29, 2005) (holding that potential environmental liability was not a MAC on the company
in a $450 million transaction); Frontier Oil Sues Holly Over Terms of Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2003, at 3 (stating the estimated amount of the deal to be $450 million in stock and
cash); Genesco, Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-II(III), at 2-3, 29-39 (Tenn. Chan. Ct.
Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://www.genesco.com/images/litigation_library/genesco-pdf.pdf
(enforcing specific performance and holding that Genesco was not MAC’d within meaning of
agreement despite substantially lower earnings in a $1.5 billion transaction); and Hexion
Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., No. Civ. A. 3841-VCL, 2008 WL 4457544 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 19, 2008) (holding that target company in $10 billion leveraged buyout had not
suffered a MAC).
4. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY
IT MATTERS 161-62 (2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 106 (7th ed.
2007); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 296 (2004). The classic
article is Richard A. Posner and Andrew M. Rosenfield’s Impossibility and Related Doctrines
in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 87-88 (1977).
5. Jeffrey Thomas Cicarella, Wake of Death: How the Current MAC Standard
Circumvents the Purpose of the MAC Clause, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 423, 426 (2007); Gilson
& Schwartz, supra note 2, at 330; Sherri L. Toub, “Buyer’s Regret” No Longer: Drafting
Effective MAC Clauses in a Post-IBP Environment, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 849, 853-54 (2003).
6. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 330.
7. There is virtually universal agreement, among both practitioners and academics, that
MAC clauses allocate risk between the parties. Cicarella, supra note 5, at 426 (explaining that
the purpose of the MAC clause is to shift risk between the parties); Yair Y. Galil, MAC
Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846, 848
(“[MAC] clauses are generally thought of as methods to allocate interim risk ....”); Gilson &
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 330 (noting that MAC clauses allocate risks between buyer and
sellers); Kari K. Hall, How Big is the MAC? Material Adverse Change Clauses in Today’s
Acquisition Environment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2003) (explaining that the purpose
Now, it is fundamental in the economic analysis of contract law
that parties use contracts to shift risks to parties who can bear them
most efficiently.4 Hence, economic theory suggests that MAC clauses
will distinguish various kinds of risk that can materialize between
the signing and closing of a merger agreement—what mergers-and-
acquisitions lawyers call deal risk—and assign each kind of deal
risk to the contracting party that can bear it most efficiently,5 that
is, the cheaper cost avoider or the superior risk bearer for such risk.6
The purpose of this Article is to describe the allocations of deal risk
typically made in MAC clauses7 in merger agreements involving
2014 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2007
of a MAC clause is to allocate risk between buyer and seller during the time between signing
and closing); Rod J. Howard, MACs and MAEs—Allocating the Risk of Changes Between
Signing and Closing in Recent Technology M&A Agreements, in DRAFTING CORPORATE
AGREEMENTS 2001-2002, at 329, 333 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
B-1282, 2001); Howard, supra note 2, at 222 (“MAC and MAE clauses are used to allocate
interim risks in a variety of ways.”); Celia R. Taylor, When Good Mergers Go Bad: Controlling
Corporate Managers Who Suffer a Change of Heart, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 577, 586 (2002)
(noting that by using MAC clauses, parties “try to allocate risk while they wait” during the
interim period); Alana A. Zerbe, Note, The Material Adverse Effect Provision: Multiple
Interpretations & Surprising Remedies, 22 J.L. & COM. 17, 17 (2002) (“[MAC clauses] may be
as broad or as general as is necessary to effectively allocate the risk of a change in the
financial or legal status of a firm, or within the industry itself.”).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 337-40; see infra Part III.A.
public companies and to explain why such allocations are in fact
efficient. To that end, the Article reports the results of a study of
MAC clauses in 353 business combination agreements publicly filed
in the EDGAR system of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008, classifying such
agreements by the form of consideration paid (i.e., as cash deals,
stock-for-stock deals, or cash-and-stock deals).8
I begin in Part I by describing the relevant features of the
corporate and regulatory environments that affect the creation,
mitigation, and allocation of deal risk. These features, which are
beyond the control of particular companies entering into a merger
agreement, define the bargaining space in which parties negotiate
over the allocation of deal risk. In Part II, I consider the provisions
of typical merger agreements related to deal risk, concluding with
an analysis of the various provisions of MAC clauses as revealed
in the empirical study mentioned above. In Part III, I turn to the
efficiency rationales that underlie the allocations of deal risk
disclosed in the study. I first show (Part III.A) that prior theories of
risk-allocation in MAC clauses, including Gilson and Schwartz’s
Investment Theory,9 cannot be reconciled with the empirical data,
especially the data concerning the allocations of risk made in typical
stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock transactions. I next (Part III.B)
propose a new theory of risk-allocation in MAC clauses that not only
accords with the empirical data, but also throws new light on how
contractual risk-shifting can be efficient even when neither party is
the cheaper cost avoider nor superior risk bearer of a particular
risk. In Part IV, I provide the full results and technical details of the
2009] THE ECONOMICS OF DEAL RISK 2015
10. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 333-34 (discussing delays imposed on parties
by regulatory regimes).
11. See Hall, supra note 7, at 1064 (noting the typical buyer and seller bargaining
positions for negotiating MAC clauses).
12. E.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 93.
13. Id. (stating that when parties to a contract do not perform their obligations
simultaneously, “two dangers to the process of exchange arise—opportunism and unforeseen
contingencies”); SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 314-20 (discussing the renegotiation of contracts).
14. Hall, supra note 7, at 1062.
empirical study of MAC clauses in business combination agree-
ments. In Part V, I make some concluding observations.
I. FEATURES OF THE CORPORATE AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS
THAT AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF DEAL RISK
Business combinations occur within a preexisting legal environ-
ment that is beyond the choosing of the parties to the transaction.10
Various features of this environment create, mitigate, and even, in
part, allocate deal risk, and thus define the bargaining space in
which parties negotiate over shifting kinds of deal risk in MAC
clauses.11 Understanding why the allocations that the parties agree
to in MAC clauses are efficient thus requires understanding the
constraints related to deal risk within which they bargain. I begin,
accordingly, by describing the aspects of the corporate, securities,
and regulatory regimes under which business combinations occur as
these affect the allocation of deal risk.
A. The Creation of Deal Risk: Non-Simultaneous Signing and
Closing
The problem of deal risk in business combinations is a special
case of a well-known problem in the law of contracts—the problem
of delayed performance.12 When an agreement is struck at one time
but performance by one or both parties occurs only later, interven-
ing events may affect a party’s willingness to complete the deal.13
Hence, the parties to the agreement must face the problem of
allocating between them risks that may materialize during the
interim period.14 In many contracts, the problem of delayed
performance arises because one party’s performance simply takes
2016 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2007
15. POSNER, supra note 4, at 93.
16. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 149-50 (1975).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 149 (noting that a merger of a publicly-held seller will always involve non-
simultaneous signing and closing); 1 LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 1.02[1] (2008) (describing stock
purchase transactions).
20. FREUND, supra note 16, at 148-52 (discussing simultaneous versus non-simultaneous
signing and closing of transactions); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.04[2] (explaining
deferred versus simultaneous closing).
21. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 64-65; POSNER, supra note 4, at 11; SHAVELL,
supra note 4, at 296.
22. FREUND, supra note 16, at 149 (stating that if simultaneous signing and closing is
possible, then it is often preferable and noting various advantages of simultaneity).
23. FREUND, supra note 16, at 148-49 (explaining how corporate law and federal securities
law combine to necessitate non-simultaneous signing and closing in the sale of a public
company); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.04[1][i] (federal securities laws).
24. See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.04[1][c][i] (explaining federal securities laws
and Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act); MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS §§ 7.01-7.11 (2008) (discussing antitrust concerns
in the context of corporate acquisitions); id. § 3.06[2] (discussing federal and state regulation
that delay closing); Kling et al., supra note 1, at 781 (discussing antitrust filings required
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act).
a long time to complete (for example, building a house).15 That is not
the case with business combinations.16 A business combination is
merely a transfer of property (usually securities) and a payment of
consideration (usually either cash or securities) that, in its nature,
could be effected simultaneously with entering into an agreement.17
There is nothing in the nature of the transaction that prevents the
parties from entering into the agreement and performing on the
agreement (paying the purchase price and transferring ownership
of the business) at one and the same time.18 In fact, many small
business combinations are effected in exactly this way.19 In mergers-
and-acquisitions jargon, such transactions involve simultaneous
signing and closing.20 In such transactions, the problem of deal risk
never arises, and in keeping with the general human preference for
risk aversion,21 when a deal can be simultaneously signed and
closed, it almost always is.22 
When this is not possible, the reasons for the non-simultaneity of
signing and closing are almost always legal. That is, they arise
under corporate or securities laws,23 under the antitrust laws or
regulatory regimes applicable to particular industries,24 or under
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25. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 2.08[2] (discussing third-party consents); LIPTON
& STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 3.06[4] (discussing contractual provisions).
26. See Kling et al., supra note 1, at 781.
27. See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.02[1] (discussing stock purchase
transactions); id. at § 1.02[3] (describing statutory mergers); Igor Kirman & Louis Goldberg,
Choosing Deal Structure 195-204, in DOING DEALS 2008: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS AND
BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE (Igor Kirman ed., 2008) (explaining various transaction
structures); see also Diane Holt Frankle, Agreement and Plan of Reorganization By and
Among Acquiror, Inc. Target Acquisition Corporation, Target Inc. and Principal Shareholder,
as Shareholders’ Agent, in 2 ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 2007, at
475, 493-94, 556-62 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1611, 2007)
(describing a merger involving a private company); David W. Pollak, Asset Purchase
Agreement Buyer Form, in 2 ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 2007, at
151, 179-81, 237-41 (discussing asset purchases of private companies); id. at 9, 27-30, 98-101
(explaining stock purchases of private companies).
28. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2001) (requiring approval of stockholders for a
corporation to merge); see also R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 9.1, 9.5 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining the
requirement of shareholder votes for corporations constituent to the merger); KLING &
NUGENT, supra note 19, § 2.03[1]-[2] (same); EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J. TUREZYN &
ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 251.2 (5th ed.
2006) (same); cf. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 903 (consol. 1983) (stating that authorization by
shareholders is required to merge); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04 (2008) (same). See
generally 15 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 7063 (rev. ed. 2008) (“Subject to certain exceptions, a
merger or a consolidation cannot be effected merely by the action of the boards of directors but
must be consented to by at least a majority of the shareholders.”).
agreements with third parties by which one of the merging compa-
nies is already bound.25 Each of these, independently of the others,
can necessitate non-simultaneous signing and closing, and often
there will be multiple independent reasons for delay.26 Because the
longer the delay, the greater the deal risk, what usually matters
most is the factor that imposes the longest delay between signing
and closing.
1. Corporate and Securities Laws
As far as corporate law is concerned, the most fundamental
reason for the non-simultaneity of signing and closing in transac-
tions involving public companies is that such transactions are
almost invariably structured as statutory mergers,27 and the
corporate laws of all states require that the shareholders of the
corporations engaging in a statutory merger approve the transac-
tion.28 There are various ways of obtaining shareholder approval,
2018 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2007
29. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.02[3]; LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, §
1.02; Kirman & Goldberg, supra note 27; see also the classic article, James Freund & Richard
Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Acquisition Approach, 34 BUS. LAW. (ABA)
1679, 1693-95 (1979).
30. See infra section I.B for a discussion on shareholder votes.
31. FREUND, supra note 16, at 149; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 11.4[9]; LIPTON &
STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 1.02[3].
32. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 17.3.5 (1986) (discussing federal
securities laws provisions relevant to approving a merger); FREUND, supra note 16, at 149
(discussing drafting a proxy statement and clearing it with the SEC); KLING & NUGENT, supra
note 19, § 2.03. In stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals, because the consideration being
offered in the merger includes shares of the acquirer, the acquirer must also file a registration
statement with the SEC and have it declared effective before the shares may be issued.
CLARK, supra, § 10.2.3 (1986). See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 5.1[1] (5th ed. 2005) (explaining that when securities are offered as
consideration in a merger, there is a “sale” of securities for purposes of the Securities Act of
1933); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 5.02[1] (describing the registration requirements
under the Securities Act of 1933).
33. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 176 (2003) (stating
that drafting and clearing a proxy statement can take “two to four months”); FREUND, supra
note 16, at 149; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 5.03[2] (discussing the process of preparing
and clearing a proxy statement with the SEC).
but all of them involve a delay between the time the corporate
parties enter into a merger agreement and the time the merger can
be effected by filing articles of merger with the relevant state
authorities.
Most commonly, in so-called “one-step” transactions,29 the merger
agreement will provide that at least the target company, and
perhaps the acquiring company as well,30 will prepare proxy
statements soliciting the approval of their shareholders and will call
shareholder meetings to approve the merger.31 Hence, one or both
corporations must draft a proxy statement, file and clear it with the
SEC under the relevant provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
and the proxy rules, print the statement, distribute it to sharehold-
ers, and comply with the notice period associated with calling
shareholder meetings as required by state corporate law and their
own organizing documents.32 The process can easily take ninety
days.33 If all goes well, after the shareholders approve the merger,
the parties will almost immediately file articles of merger with the
relevant secretary of state and effect the merger.
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34. CLARK, supra note 32, § 11.2 (describing two-step acquisitions); KLING & NUGENT,
supra note 19, § 1.02[8][b]; Kirman & Goldberg, supra note 27, at 184-89 (comparing
advantages and disadvantages of one-step versus two-step transactions).
35. The text here somewhat oversimplifies. It is possible to make this offer for less than
all the shares of the target, but this would be unusual in a friendly, two-step transaction. See,
e.g., In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 31-32 (Del. Ch. 2001) (describing a friendly
two-step transaction).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2008) (codifying Rule 14e-1(a) under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934). See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 669
(2002) (discussing Rule 14e-1); HAZEN, supra note 32, § 11.5.3[B] (stating rule that a tender
offer must be held open for at least twenty business days); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note
24, § 2.05[1][a] (explaining twenty business day rule). If the consideration the acquirer offers
in the two-step transaction is not cash but instead its own shares, however (that is, we have
an “exchange offer” rather than a tender offer, properly so-called), then the acquirer will also
be required under the Securities Act to file and have declared effective a registration
statement related to the sale of such shares before the offer may close. HAZEN, supra note 32,
§ 2.3[4] (explaining that exchange offers are subject to the Securities Act of 1933); see also
KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 5.02[3] (explaining securities law treatment of exchange
offers).
37. Kirman & Goldberg, supra note 27, at 207 (giving timetables for completion of
transactions with various structures and noting that all cash, two-step transactions can close
in four to eight weeks, or fewer than forty business days).
38. See infra section I.B. for a discussion of shareholder votes.
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2006) (short-form merger statute providing
Less commonly, in so-called “two-step” transactions,34 the corpo-
rations enter into a merger agreement that provides that the
acquirer will launch a tender offer for the outstanding shares of the
target (the first step in the two-step transaction).35 Under the
Williams Act and the related tender offer rules, the acquirer will be
required to prepare and file a Schedule TO with the SEC and hold
the tender offer open for at least twenty business days.36 There will
thus be a delay of about forty to sixty days between signing the
merger agreement and closing the offer.37 If the acquirer also has to
obtain the approval of its own shareholders,38 then before closing the
tender offer it will have to file and clear a proxy statement with the
SEC, print it, distribute it to shareholders, provide notice, and hold
a shareholder meeting. In that case, the delay will approach that for
one-step transactions—about ninety days.39 In any event, after the
closing of the tender offer, the acquirer will have voting control of
the target and will be able to effect a merger between the target and
one of its own subsidiaries (the second step in the two-step transac-
tion), usually without further delay.40
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that if the corporation owns at least 90 percent of each class of outstanding shares of a
subsidiary, it may merge the subsidiary with another subsidiary without shareholder vote);
see also Glassman v. Unocal, 777 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. 2001) (explaining how Delaware short-
form merger statute allows elimination of minority shareholders without vote, notice, or other
indicia of procedural fairness). For a discussion on short-form mergers, see BALOTTI &
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 28, § 9.17; CLARK, supra note 32, § 11.2; KLING & NUGENT, supra
note 19, § 1.02(6); WELCH, TUREZYN & SAUNDERS, supra note 28, § 253; 15 FLETCHER CYC.
CORP., supra note 28, § 7047.40; Kirman & Goldberg, supra note 27, at 207 (describing the
second step of the merger required in a two-step transaction). For a discussion of Delaware
fiduciary law related to two-step transactions, see BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 28, §
9.36A.
41. See generally FREUND, supra note 16, at 300 (explaining the approval of regulatory
authorities is a common condition of closing for business combination transactions); KLING &
NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.04[1][c][ii] (noting the approvals of regulatory agencies needed to
close business combinations in regulated industries); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24,
§ 3.06[2]; Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Contract Interpretation in Acquisition Agreements: The
Content of Material Adverse Change, INSIGHTS, Sept. 2001, at 2 (discussing regulatory
approvals needed to complete mergers).
42. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006).
For a general discussion of the HSR Act, see STEPHEN M. AXINN, BLAINE V. FOGG, NEAL R.
STOLL & BRUCE J. PRAGER, ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST
IMPROVEMENTS ACT (2008); PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PRACTICE MANUAL (Anthony W.
Swisher & Neil W. Imus eds., 2007). For its relevance in business combination transactions,
see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 1473-94 (2d ed. 1995); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, §§ 7.01-7.11
(2006).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)(2) (2006). The relevant thresholds are indexed annually to the U.S.
gross national product. Id. On January 18, 2008, the Federal Trade Commission announced
2. Antitrust and Regulatory Regimes
Many corporate acquisitions require the approval of various
governmental regulators.41 Given that in most cases the relevant
regulators will consider approving only transactions that have been
memorialized in a definitive agreement, when such an approval is
required, the parties must first enter into an agreement and then
seek the required approvals. Only once the approval is granted can
the parties close the transaction.
The most commonly required governmental approval arises under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the
HSR Act),42 which provides that, before they may effect a business
combination, parties engaged in commerce in the United States
must, if they meet certain minimum requirements related to the
size of the transaction and the net assets and annual sales of the
parties,43 file with the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal
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the thresholds for transactions closing on or after February 29, 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 19,
5191-92 (Jan. 28, 2008). In particular, transactions valued at $63.1 million or less are exempt
from the HSR Act. For transactions valued at more than $63.1 million but less than $252.3
million, the transaction must be reported under the Act if one person to the transaction has
total assets or net sales of $126.2 million or more, and the other person to the transaction has
total assets or net sales of $12.6 million or more. Id. All transactions of value over $252.3
million must be reported. Id.
44. See AXINN, FOGG, STOLL & PRAGER, supra note 42, § 5 (explaining what information
must be included in HSR filing).
45. See supra note 40.
46. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 7.02[1][e][ii].
47. Id.
48. Id. at §§ 7.01-7.11.
49. For example, the DOJ cleared the merger between National Oilwell Varco, Inc., and
Grant PrideCo, Inc., in less than thirty days. Press Release, Grant PrideCo, Inc., National
Oilwell Varco and Grant PrideCo Announce Early Termination Granted (Mar. 7, 2008),
available at www.grantprideco.com/apps/PressReleases/viewitem.asp?id=174. But the merger
of satellite radio companies Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc. and XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc.
took more than a year to clear antitrust review with the Department of Justice. Press Release,
Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., Merger of Sirius and XM Clears DOJ (Mar. 24, 2008), available
at http://investor.sirius.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=301291. See generally AXINN, FOGG,
STOLL & PRAGER, supra note 42, § 6 (explaining the second-request process under the HSR
Act); see also John R. Wilke & Bryan Gruley, Acquisitions Can Mean Long-Lasting Scrutiny
by Antitrust Agencies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1997, at A1.
Trade Commission (FTC) certain information regarding the effect
of the proposed transaction on competition in relevant markets.44
Because the relevant thresholds are quite low, all but the smallest
acquisitions require approval under the HSR Act and so cannot be
simultaneously signed and closed.45 The delay between signing and
closing that is required to comply with the HSR Act will vary with
the seriousness of the antitrust concerns raised by the transaction.46
If the combination raises no significant issues, the delay will
typically be less than thirty days from the time the parties make the
required filing.47 In a merger between large companies that compete
against each other in many different markets, the antitrust issues
raised can be staggeringly complex, and the process of assembling
the information that the DOJ or the FTC will require48 and then
obtaining the consent of the relevant agency, can take more than a
year.49
In addition to clearance under the antitrust laws, business
combinations between parties operating in regulated industries also
usually require the approval of the regulatory agencies superintend-
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50. On the regulation of business combinations among financial institutions, see generally
LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 11.08; Edward D. Herlihy, Financial Institutions
M&A 2007: Continued Rich Diversity in an Active M&A Market—An Annual Review of
Leading Developments, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (2007).
51. Agreement and Plan of Merger, Countrywide Financial Corp. and Bank of America,
§§ 3.4, 4.4 (Jan. 11, 2008) (on file with the SEC as Exhibit 2.1 to Form 8-K).
52. See, e.g., Agreement and Plan of Merger, XM Satellite Holdings, Inc., and Sirius
Satellite Radio, Inc., §§ 3.1(c)(iii), 3.2(c) (Feb. 19, 2007) (on file with the SEC as Exhibit 2.1
to Form 8-K). For approvals needed to complete transactions involving entities regulated
under the Communications Act, see generally KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 5.05[2].
53. Agreement and Plan of Merger, Delta Airlines, Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corp., §§
3.1(c)(v)(b), 3.2(c)(v)(b) (Apr. 14, 2008) (on file with the SEC as Exhibit 2.1 to Form 8-K)
(referring to Northwest’s and Delta’s needing “consents, approvals, orders exemptions and
authorizations related to the airline industry” in order to complete the merger). For approvals
needed to complete transactions involving entities regulated under the Federal Aviation Act,
see KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 5.05[3]. Public utility transactions also generally
require long interim periods to obtain necessary government approvals. See generally
Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 482, 490-92, 513-20 (W.D. Pa. 1999)
(explaining that the long interim period in a merger transaction ended in one public utility
declaring a MAC on another); Seth A. Kaplan & Gregory N. Racz, It Seemed Like a Good Idea
at the Time: Recent Trends in Mergers and Acquisitions in the Electric and Gas Utility
Industries, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: FINANCING, REGULATORY AND
BUSINESS ISSUES 491, 493-98 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. BO-
0079, 1998). 
54. Exon-Florio Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006); see also GILSON & BLACK, supra note
42, at 1495-1502 (discussing Exon-Florio in connection with corporate acquisitions). For a
discussion of disclosure issues related to Exon-Florio, see LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note
24, § 3.03[3]. For the importance of Exon-Florio generally, see Marc Greidinger, The Exon-
Florio Amendment: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 6 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 111-21
(1991).
ing those industries.50 Thus, a merger between banks may require
the approval of the Federal Reserve or other banking authorities.51
A merger between communications companies may require the
approval of the Federal Communications Commission,52 while a
merger between airlines may require the approval of the Federal
Aviation Administration and the Department of Transportation,53
and so on. Similarly, under the Exon-Florio Act, when an acquisition
of an American company by a foreign acquirer may raise national
security concerns, the transaction will be reviewed by the Council
on Foreign Investment in the United States.54 In each case, there
will be a significant delay between the time the parties enter into
the merger agreement and the time, if ever, the relevant govern-
ment regulators approve the transaction. The length of the delay
will vary with the circumstances, but the delay involved in obtain-
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55. See FREUND, supra note 16, at 437-39 (discussing governmental consents needed to
close transaction); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 5.05; LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note
24, § 3.06[2]; Howard, supra note 2, at 247 (noting that in regulated industries “approvals
may take a year or more to obtain”).
56. FREUND, supra note 16, 435-39 (discussing the necessity of obtaining third-party
consents prior to closing); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 2.08[2]; LIPTON & STEINBERGER,
supra note 24, § 3.06[4] (third-party consents needed for closing); Howard, supra note 2, at
227 (stating that the target “may have contracts with change-in-control provisions which
allow cancellation or which require consents from third parties,” and noting that such
“consents may be difficult, impossible or expensive to obtain”).
57. See sources cited supra note 56.
58. The party could seek the third party’s consent prior to entering a definitive merger
agreement, and although this is sometimes done, it has various disadvantages, especially for
public companies, including the possibility of premature disclosure of the transaction, insider
trading and fair disclosure issues, and so on.
59. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 2.08[2].
60. Howard, supra note 2, at 227.
ing such regulatory approvals is often longer than any delay arising
under the corporate, securities, or antitrust laws.55
3. Third-Party Consents
Finally, sometimes a party to a business combination has
previously entered into a contract—for example, a credit facility
with a bank, a lease for an important piece of real property, an
agreement with a major customer, etc.—that provides that the party
will not engage in a business combination without the consent of the
counterparty.56 Such clauses are intended to protect the counter-
party against the risk of finding itself in a contractual relationship
with a party under the control of someone other than the person
with whom it originally contracted.57 When a party bound by such
an agreement wants to enter into a business combination, it thus
faces a choice: it can either seek the consent of the counterparty,
which requires time and so necessitates an interim period between
signing and closing,58 or else breach the agreement by closing the
transaction without the consent of the counterparty (or, in mergers-
and-acquisition lawyers’ jargon, “close over” the agreement), which
might subject it to liability for breach of contract.59 The party makes
this decision, of course, based on the relative costs and benefits of
each possible course of action.60 In a major credit agreement with a
commercial bank, for example, seeking the consent of the lender (or
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61. FREUND, supra note 16, at 435-37 (discussing obtaining consents from financial
institutions).
62. See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 8 (explaining due diligence as a cause for
delay).
63. See FREUND, supra note 16, at 300.
64. See, for example, the outcome of the Cerberus-United Rentals transaction. United
Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810, 813-14 (Del. Ch. 2007); Michael J. de la
Merced, United Rentals Will Not Appeal Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2007, at C3 (explaining
that United Rentals would not appeal the decision by the Delaware Chancery Court that the
private equity firm Cerberus was not required to close the merger; United Rentals would
receive a $100 million break-up fee instead).
else refinancing the debt and so terminating the agreement) would
very likely be the only cost-effective option.61 With a minor commer-
cial agreement such as a lease for equipment not material to the
business, it would likely be cheaper to close over the agreement.
Even with respect to contractual consents that the party determines
it must obtain prior to closing, it is usually possible to obtain such
consents relatively quickly—that is, well within the time needed to
comply with corporate and securities laws, the HSR Act, or other
applicable regulatory regimes.62
B. Shareholder Votes as Mechanisms To Limit Deal Risk
Although the delay needed to obtain shareholder approval
generates the problem of deal risk, the option a shareholder vote
provides to the parties—either to approve or cancel a transaction—
also allocates in part that risk between the parties. If a transaction
has become unattractive to a party between signing and the time of
its shareholder vote, the party’s shareholders can vote down the
transaction, thus allowing the party to walk away from the transac-
tion63 by, at most, paying the disappointed counterparty a relatively
modest termination fee as may have been agreed upon in the
merger agreement.64 Hence, regardless of what any MAC clauses in
the agreement may say, a party that holds a shareholder vote on the
transaction will bear no deal risk at all related to events occurring
after signing but before the vote. In two-step transactions, the
option of target shareholders to tender or withhold their shares
(along with their rights under the tender offer rules to withdraw
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65. HAZEN, supra note 32, § 11.5[3][B]; see also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
66. For brevity (and because one-step transactions are more common than two-step
transactions), I shall sometimes refer to “shareholder votes” when I mean to include the choice
that target shareholders have in two-step transactions to either tender their shares into the
acquirer’s offer or else withhold them.
67. Kirman & Goldberg, supra note 27, at 183 (noting the importance of whether the
target, acquirer, or both hold shareholder votes).
68. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 28, § 9.15.
69. Indeed, the fact that a party assumes this role in a triangular merger is what makes
that party the acquirer and the other party the target, at least from a legal (as opposed to
economic) point of view.
70. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 33, at 161-62 (discussing triangular transactions); BALOTTI
& FINKELSTEIN, supra note 28, §§ 9.7 (describing triangular mergers), 9.8 (describing reverse
triangular mergers); CLARK, supra note 32, § 10.4 (discussing various forms of mergers,
including triangular mergers); FREUND, supra note 16, at 78-79, 92-93 (discussing triangular
tendered shares prior to the expiration of the offer)65 functions in a
manner analogous to a shareholder vote.66
Now, as will be discussed below, the target’s shareholders always
vote on the merger (or can decide to tender or withhold their shares
in two-step transactions), and so targets always have the protection
against deal risk that a shareholder vote affords. Unfortunately,
there is no simple rule as to whether the acquirer’s shareholders
must also vote on the transaction. That issue turns on the structure
of the transaction (primarily the use of the triangular merger
structure), the form of consideration to be paid in the transaction
(i.e., cash or stock), and whether the shares of the acquirer are listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Nasdaq Stock
Market (Nasdaq) and so are subject to the rules of those bodies.
1. Which Parties Vote67
The basic corporate law rule is that the approval of the sharehold-
ers of all corporations constituent to the merger is required to
consummate the transaction.68 Hence, if the target were to merge
into the acquirer, the approval of the shareholders of both corpora-
tions would be required. The so-called triangular merger structure,
however, allows the parties using the one-step structure to circum-
vent this requirement with respect to the acquirer.69 In the triangu-
lar structure, the acquirer creates a wholly-owned subsidiary solely
for purposes of effecting the transaction, and the target merges with
this subsidiary, not the acquirer itself.70 Under state corporate law,
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mergers); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, §§ 1.03[4] (discussing forward triangular mergers),
1.03[5] (discussing reverse triangular mergers); WELCH, TUREZYN & SAUNDERS, supra note
28, § 251.3.3; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 36, § 12.3(C); Note, Three-Party Mergers: The
Fourth Form of Corporate Acquisitions, 57 VA. L. REV. 1242 (1971) (same).
71. See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 28, § 9.7.
72. The primary such advantage is that, after the completion of the merger, the surviving
corporation of the merger is a subsidiary of the acquirer. Hence, the acquirer enjoys limited
corporate liability with respect to the liabilities of the target company and will become legally
responsible for these only if there are reasons that would justify piercing the corporate veil
from the surviving corporation up to the acquirer. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 36, § 12.3(C)
(discussing triangular merger as a technique to limit successor liability); CLARK, supra note
32, § 10.4 (explaining how triangular form can preserve the acquirer’s assets from liabilities
of the target). The triangular form is also friendly to most tax and accounting advantages that
parties to business combinations generally try to capture. CLARK, supra note 32, §§ 10.2.1
(discussing federal tax issues), 10.2.2 (describing accounting issues); see KLING & NUGENT,
supra note 19, §§ 1.03[4] (discussing forward triangular mergers), 1.03[5] (discussing reverse
triangular mergers); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, §§ 1.10[1][a][ii] (discussing tax
aspects of forward triangular mergers), 1.10[1][a][iii] (explaining tax aspects of reverse
triangular mergers).
73. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c), available at http://www.nyse.com/
regulation/nyse/1182508124422.html (explaining that shareholder approval is required prior
the target’s shareholders still have to vote on the transaction.71 The
shareholders of the acquirer’s subsidiary will also have to vote, but
the subsidiary’s sole shareholder is the acquirer itself, which
approves the merger as a matter of course. Because the acquirer is
not a constituent corporation to the merger, the acquirer is not
required to seek the approval of its shareholders. There are nu-
merous additional technical advantages to the triangular structure,
and thus virtually all public-company business combinations are
structured in this way.72
At this point, however, the form of consideration to be paid in the
merger—whether shareholders of the target will receive either cash
or shares of the acquirer or a mixture thereof as consideration for
their shares—becomes important. If the merger consideration is
cash, then as explained above, the acquirer’s shareholders will not
vote. But if the merger consideration is stock of the acquirer and the
acquirer’s shares are publicly traded on either the NYSE or Nasdaq,
then the rules of these bodies may require a vote of the acquirer’s
shareholders after all. In particular, if the shares to be issued in the
transaction aggregate 20 percent or more of the shares of the
acquirer outstanding prior to the transaction, then applicable
NYSE73 or Nasdaq74 rules will require that the business combination
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to the issuance of common stock or securities convertible into common stock if such stock will
have, upon issuance, voting power equal to or in excess of 20 percent of the voting power
outstanding before the issuance of such stock or such securities); see also KLING & NUGENT,
supra note 19, § 2.04[1] (discussing NYSE rules on shareholder approval); LIPTON &
STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 4.01[4].
74. NASDAQ MANUAL, Stock Market Rule 4350(i)(1)(C)(ii)(a), available at http://nasdaq.
cchwallstreet.com/main (shareholder approval required prior to issuance of common stock or
securities convertible into common stock if such stock will have, upon issuance, voting power
equal to or in excess of 20 percent of the voting power outstanding before the issuance of such
stock or such securities); see also KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 2.04[2] (discussing
Nasdaq rules on shareholder approval); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 4.03[4].
75. Even if the target shareholders have tendered their shares and later change their
minds, the tender offer rules require that the shareholders may withdraw shares tendered
up until the expiration of the offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (codifying Rule 14d-7 under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 36, at 669
(discussing withdrawal rights under Rule 14d-7); HAZEN, supra note 32, § 11.5[3][B]
(discussing withdrawal rights generally); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 2.05[2].
76. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
be approved by the shareholders of the acquirer. This will be true
regardless of whether the transaction is structured in one or two
steps and even in the triangular structure when the acquirer is not
a constituent corporation of the merger.
To summarize, the target’s shareholders will always have an
opportunity to cancel a deal that has become unfavorable, either
because they will vote on the transaction (in a one-step transaction)
or else because they may choose to withhold their shares from the
acquirer’s tender offer (in a two-step transaction).75 If the merger
consideration is cash, the acquirer’s shareholders will not vote, and
so the acquirer will not have the protection against deal risk that a
shareholder vote affords. If the merger consideration is shares of
acquirer stock, however, the acquirer’s shareholders will still not
vote if the number of shares to be issued is relatively small (i.e., less
than 20 percent of the shares currently outstanding), but will vote
if the number of shares is large (i.e., 20 percent or more of the
shares currently outstanding).
Regarding deal risk, the result is that in all cash mergers and in
stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock mergers between large acquirers
and small targets, we have an important asymmetry with respect to
downside deal risk because the target’s shareholders, but not the
acquirer’s, will have an opportunity to cancel the deal at the time of
their shareholder vote.76 In most stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock
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77. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
78. See John Goldstein, Ciena’s Third Act, DAILY PRESS, Sept. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.dailypress.com/entertainment/arts/bal-question0910,0,5394874.story (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009).
79. Howard, supra note 2, at 233 (discussing Tellabs-Ciena merger); Ciena Tellabs Merger
Delay, WASH. BUS. J., Sept. 2, 1998 (discussing delay of the merger).
mergers (that is, other than those in which there is a great disparity
in size between acquirer and target), we have a symmetrical
situation because the shareholders of both parties will vote on the
deal and may cancel it if it has become unfavorable.77 For example,
in the stock-for-stock transaction between Tellabs and Ciena, after
the merger agreement was signed, Ciena lost several important
orders for its products.78 When Tellabs postponed its shareholder
meeting to vote on the transaction, Ciena, knowing that the Tellabs
shareholders were likely to vote down the transaction, agreed to
accept a reduced purchase price.79 Here, the fact that Tellabs, which
was the acquirer, had to hold a shareholder vote on the transaction
protected it from downside deal risk. It had no need to rely on a
MAC clause to exit the transaction.
2. Interaction of Shareholder Votes and Regulatory Approvals
So far we have seen that (a) both the necessity of obtaining
shareholder votes and the necessity of obtaining regulatory
approvals can cause a delay between signing and closing, and (b) a
party that will have a shareholder vote on the transaction has
complete protection against downside deal risk until the time of its
shareholder vote. This is not to say, however, that such a party
should not consider the allocation of deal risk through MAC clauses.
To see why, note first that, although holding shareholder votes
and obtaining regulatory approval both take time, which of those
takes longer (and thus determines the final length of the interim
period) varies with the nature of the parties and the transaction.
For example, in a transaction between two companies in unregu-
lated industries that presents no serious antitrust issues, the only
significant governmental consent needed may be clearance under
the HSR Act, and that clearance will be forthcoming very quickly—
almost certainly within thirty days after the parties make the
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80. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (codifying Rule 14e-1(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934). See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 36, at 669 (discussing Rule 14e-1); HAZEN,
supra note 32, § 11.5(3)(B) (discussing the rule that the tender offer must be held open at least
twenty business days); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 2.05[1][a].
84. The Sirius-XM transaction is a good example. Shareholder approval from both parties
was obtained about eight months before final regulatory approval from the FCC. See Press
Release, Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., Sirius and XM Complete Merger (July 29, 2008),
available at http://investor.sirius.com/ReleaseDetail.cfm?releaseid=324858 (announcing
completion of merger under agreement entered into on Feb. 19, 2007); Press Release, Sirius
Satellite Radio, Inc., Sirius Stockholders Approve Merger with XM (Nov. 13, 2007), available
at http://investor.sirius.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=275560; Press Release, XM Satellite
Radio Holdings, Inc., XM Shareholders Vote to Approve Agreement with Sirius (Nov. 13,
2007), available at http://xmradio.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=1536;
Merger of Sirius and XM Approved by F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008, at C4.
required filings.80 In such cases, corporate and securities law factors
will determine how long the interim period will be. In a one-step
structure, the interim period will be about ninety days and will end
when the shareholder vote (or votes, as the case may be) are
obtained.81 In a two-step structure, the interim period may be as
short as forty days.82 The first-step offer will close (and the second-
step merger will occur) after the later of the termination of the
waiting period under the HSR Act or the expiration of the required
twenty business-day period for which, under the Williams Act and
tender offer rules, tender offers must be held open.83 On the other
hand, in a highly regulated industry or in an unregulated one in
which the proposed transaction raises significant antitrust issues,
the required governmental approvals will take longer to obtain than
any needed shareholder approvals, even if the parties opt for the
one-step structure. In such transactions, the shareholder vote or
votes may be obtained, but the interim period will continue for
many months before the relevant governmental authorities approve
the transaction.84
Thus, although a shareholder vote provides a party with complete
protection against downside deal risk, this is true only up until the
time the vote is held. In transactions that close immediately after
obtaining the necessary shareholder votes, the parties holding such
votes will be able to cancel the transaction virtually up until the last
minute, thus making their protection against deal risk complete for
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85. In re IBP S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 44 (Del. Ch. 2001) (explaining that Tyson
stockholders approved merger; Tyson declared a MAC only much later).
86. Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. 2005).
Frontier’s CEO worried that, because the transaction became unattractive to Holly, Holly
might “[w]alk out into the sunset” if its shareholders declined to approve the transaction. Id.
at *18.
87. Although almost all change-of-control transactions are simple cash mergers, other
kinds of transactions can, on rare occasions, effect a change of control. For example, a
transaction in which shares of the target are converted into shares of the acquirer when the
acquirer has a controlling shareholder who will continue to control the combined company
after the merger also triggers a board’s Revlon duties. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC
all practical purposes. But if the regulatory or antitrust issues
presented in the transaction are significant, shareholder votes will
be obtained early during the interim period, and the time from the
shareholder vote until closing may be considerable. In such cases,
shareholder votes do nothing to reduce downside risk after the date
of the vote and until the closing. After the shareholder vote is held,
the party will have to rely on the MAC clause to protect it against
downside deal risk. For example, in the Tyson-IBP transaction, after
its shareholders had approved the merger, Tyson decided it wanted
out of the deal and so had to argue that IBP had suffered a MAC.85
Conversely, in the Frontier Oil-Holly transaction, when Holly was
contemplating exiting the transaction, its shareholders had not yet
voted on the merger, and so it could either have declared that
Frontier had suffered a MAC or else have recommended that its
shareholders vote down the merger.86 The lesson is that shareholder
votes, although they provide complete protection against downside
deal risk until the date of the vote, do not eliminate any deal risk
arising during the period—if there is such a period—after the vote
and before closing.
C. The Effect of Revlon and Omnicare
Delaware law concerning the fiduciary duties of directors of
corporations contemplating or entering into business combinations
in some ways also affects the allocation of deal risk. In particular,
a board of directors of a Delaware corporation contemplating a
business combination that would effect a change of control of the
company (generally speaking, a merger in which the shareholders
would receive cash for their shares)87 has a so-called Revlon duty to
2009] THE ECONOMICS OF DEAL RISK 2031
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46-48 (Del. 1994). With respect to business combinations that are
not change-of-control transactions, directors are obligated to observe only their ordinary duty
of care under the business judgment rule (that is, prior to approving a transaction, they must
inform themselves of the material facts relevant to the transaction that are reasonably
available to them). Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). See generally KLING
& NUGENT, supra note 19, § 4.02[1]. They do not, however, bear the burden of proving that
they have taken reasonable steps to obtain the best transaction reasonably available to their
shareholders. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1149-50. See generally BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 36, § 12.10(E)(3) (discussing Time and QVC); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note
28, § 4.20[B] (discussing enhanced judicial scrutiny of board decisions in the context of change
of control); GILSON & BLACK, supra note 42, at 1151-52; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, §
4.04[5] (discussing circumstances under which Revlon duties are triggered); WELCH, TUREZYN
& SAUNDERS, supra note 28, § 141.2.5.5 (discussing Revlon duties); James Cole, Jr. & Igor
Kirman, Takeover Law and Practice, in DOING DEALS 2008, at 30-34 (Igor Kirman ed., 2008).
88. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) is the
leading case; see also Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 637 A.2d at 43-46; Barkan v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-88 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1280 (Del. 1989); In re Netsmart Techs. Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch.
2007). See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 36, at 350-52 (discussing Revlon duties); BALOTTI
& FINKELSTEIN, supra note 28, § 4.20[B]; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 4.04[3]; LIPTON
& STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 5A.02[1][a]; Cole & Kirman, supra note 87, at 50-51.
89. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, §§ 4.04[3] (discussing Revlon duties), 4.04[4]
(discussing auctions); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 5A.02[1][b]; Cole & Kirman,
supra note 87, at 70-73 (describing techniques for sale of a public company when Revlon
duties are triggered, including closed auctions and market checks).
90. There is, of course, also the risk that all offers attainable are too low because the
highest value realizable for the shareholders would be attained if the company remained
independent. That is the ultimate justification for the “Just Say No Defense” of Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146-49 (Del. 1990). For the Lipton view,
see LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 5A.01[7] (“Just Say No”). For academic
discussion, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 80-104 (2006) (discussing “Just Say No” in connection with
take reasonable steps to get the best price reasonably available
for its shareholders.88 This duty has two principal effects on the
problem of deal risk. First, in order to discharge the duty, directors
of targets contemplating cash mergers usually engage in some form
of market check to ensure that any transaction they approve likely
represents the highest value obtainable for the company.89 Now, in
a cash merger, the target faces no downside risk related to the
business of the acquirer. Provided only that the acquirer has the
cash to close the deal, the target and its shareholders are unaffected
by any adverse changes in the acquirer’s business. Hence, if the
target directors discharge their Revlon duties, the principal down-
side deal risk the target faces—the risk of accepting an offer that
undervalues the company—is already substantially mitigated.90
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the primacy of directors in responding to takeover offers); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock
Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1525 (2007) (describing the court’s emphasis on the
independence of directors in the Time case as a factor in the rise of independent directors in
the United States). See generally Martin Lipton, Twenty-Five Years After Takeover Bids in the
Target’s Boardroom: Old Battles, New Attacks and the Continuing War, in Symposium on
Takeover Bids in the Boardroom: 25 Years Later, 60 BUS. LAW 1369 passim (2005) (discussing
Lipton’s Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom and treating “Just Say No” defense).
91. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936-39 (Del. 2003) (holding that
an effective fiduciary out is required). For the considerable academic criticism of Omnicare,
see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
92. Cicarella, supra note 5, at 423, 428-29 (discussing the effect on allocation of deal risk
under MAC clauses of legal changes that make merger agreements into put options in favor
of the seller); Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 335 (discussing legal innovations that
enable the seller always to accept a higher competing bid or to compel a renegotiation of price
with the original acquirer); Client Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare (Apr. 10, 2003) (speculating that Omnicare means that Delaware
is an “option state”).
Second, after signing but before closing, other aspects of Delaware
law limit the actions that a target board may take to prevent a third
party from making an offer for the company superior to that
contained in the agreement. The relevant decisions of the Delaware
courts seem to apply to both change-of-control transactions (e.g.,
cash mergers) and non-change-of-control transactions (e.g., typical
stock-for-stock mergers), and their effects are varied. Most impor-
tant for our purposes, they limit contractual restrictions in the
merger agreement regarding the board’s soliciting or responding to
competing offers for the company. In particular, under Omnicare v.
NCS Healthcare, the rule in Delaware appears to be that, in all
business combination transactions, a board of directors must remain
free to consider better offers that may emerge between signing and
closing, to recommend that the shareholders reject the first offer in
favor of the second, and to retain the legal right to bring such
superior offers before their shareholders for consideration (a so-
called “fiduciary out”).91 Often, though not always, these rights of
the target board are supplemented with a right to terminate the
merger agreement prior to a vote of the target shareholders if a
superior offer emerges.
Some scholars and practitioners have suggested that this aspect
of Delaware law makes merger agreements into put options in favor
of the seller,92 which would mean that deal risk for target companies
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93. Reuters, Cyprus Amax and Asarco Agree to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1999, at C4.
94. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Materials Co., Nos. CIV.A. 17398, 17383, 16427,
1999 WL 1054255, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (noting that defendants “Cyprus Amax and
Asarco are under no duty to negotiate, under the teachings of Time Warner” because “in a
transaction not involving a change of control or sale of the company, that is undoubtedly the
case”).
95. Joseph B. Treaster, Phelps Dodge Opens Hostile Bid for Smaller Rivals, N.Y. TIMES,
would be virtually eliminated. This, I think, misunderstands the
situation. The fiduciary duties at issue apply only when the corpora-
tion’s shareholders will vote on the transaction, and the fiduciary
out is relevant only during the period from signing until the
shareholder vote. That is, the board’s fiduciary out—its right to
terminate or recommend against a merger agreement if the deal
becomes unattractive—is relevant only when the shareholders will
subsequently have a similar right to terminate the deal by voting it
down. The relevant aspects of Delaware law thus do not create
cancellation rights where they otherwise would not exist. All that
the relevant law does is affect which corporate decision maker will
exercise the option to cancel—the directors or the shareholders—
and when the option will be exercised—either earlier in time by the
directors or later in time by the shareholders. In other words, all
business combinations in which a party’s shareholders will vote on
the transaction are in effect options, even when the party with a
vote is the acquirer. Revlon and Omnicare merely affect by whom
(directors versus shareholders) and when (earlier versus later) the
option can be exercised. This does not fundamentally change the
situation that, in a certain class of transactions, a party has an
opportunity to cancel a deal after signing and before closing. It is
the shareholder vote—not management’s right or duty to negotiate
better offers prior to such vote—that is the real limiting factor.
The outcome of the Phelps Dodge-Cyprus Amax and the Phelps
Dodge-Asarco transactions illustrates this point. Cyprus Amax
and Asarco, both copper mining companies, had entered into a
merger agreement.93 The agreement contemplated a stock-for-stock
exchange, and so neither board of directors had triggered its Revlon
duties.94 After the merger agreement was signed, but before the
shareholders of either company voted on the merger, Phelps
Dodge, a larger copper mining company, offered to acquire both
Cyprus Amax and Asarco.95 Rebuffed, it eventually launched a
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Aug. 28, 1999, at C1.
96. Id.
97. Phelps Dodge, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2.
98. Laura M. Holson, A Corporate Chess Game: Copper Industry Rivals in Nasty,
Convoluted Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at C1; Agis Salpukas, Copper Producers
Consider Scuttling Merger Agreement, Companies May Seek Takeovers Instead, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1999, at C2.
99. Phelps Dodge-Cyprus Deal Ends Hostile Takeover Bid; Transaction Also Stages Effort
by Asarco, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at C5 (noting that Phelps Dodge and Cyprus Amax agree
to deal); Phelps Dodge to Buy Asarco, Creating Top Copper Company, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999,
at C6. Asarco, however, later terminated its agreement with Phelps Dodge in order to accept
a topping offer from Grupo Mexico. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Asarco Accepts Grupo Mexico’s $1.18
Billion Takeover Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1999 at C1.
100. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). The transactions
among Phelps Dodge, Cyprus Amax, and Asarco occurred years before Omnicare.
hostile exchange offer for the shares of both companies and
challenged in Delaware court various provisions of the Cyprus
Amax-Asarco merger agreement.96 In refusing to enjoin the Cyprus
Amax and Asarco shareholder meetings, Chancellor Chandler wrote
that he “need not rescue the shareholders from losing out on a
premium bid” from Phelps Dodge—the Cyprus Amax-Asarco deal
included no premium—because “they can simply vote down the
Cyprus/Asarco transaction ....”97 The chancellor was exactly right.
When it became clear that the shareholders of both Cyprus Amax
and Asarco were going to vote down the merger,98 both companies
postponed their shareholder votes, and each ultimately agreed to be
acquired by Phelps Dodge.99
Thus, even when Revlon duties do not apply and even without
regard to the holding in Omnicare,100 the existence of a shareholder
vote—regardless of what management may do or have the right to
do under the merger agreement—virtually ensures that if a superior
offer emerges for the company or if the merger otherwise becomes
unattractive, shareholders can be counted upon to vote down an
inferior transaction in order to obtain a better one. If the board also
has an effective fiduciary out, the board may well use the out to
terminate the merger agreement ahead of the shareholder meeting,
but this merely accelerates the inevitable result.
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101. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 330 (noting that the MAC definition “occupies
center stage in the negotiation of merger agreements”).
102. Hall, supra note 7, at 1063 (noting that MAC clauses are “negotiated in almost every
transaction”); Rosenbloom & Mann, supra note 2, at 11 (stating “courts perceive MAC/MAE
provisions as likely to have been heavily negotiated by sophisticated parties”); Bradley C.
Sagraves & Bobak Talebian, Material Adverse Change Clauses in Tennessee: Genesco v. Finish
Line, 9 TENN. J. BUS. L. 343, 347 (2008) (noting that MAC clauses are intensely negotiated
and citing Taylor, supra note 7, at 587); see also Howard, supra note 2, at 221; Galil, supra
note 7, at 848 (declaring that some MAC clauses are “heavily negotiated”); Toub, supra note
5, at 892 (stating that in MAC clauses, “each and every word, no matter how insignificant it
may seem at the time of drafting, is potentially the most important word in the clause”
(emphasis omitted)).
103. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 33, at 175 (“The contents of the typical acquisition agreement
have become quite standardized.”).
104. See FREUND, supra note 16, at 234-41 (discussing the function of disclosure schedule
in an acquisition agreement). For a good example of underestimating the importance of
disclosure schedules, see In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 798 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001), in which
a disclosure schedule allowed the target to recognize unlimited liabilities for accounting fraud
at a subsidiary, and neither senior executives nor senior lawyers for the acquirer were even
aware of the schedule’s existence when the agreement was signed. Id. at 40.
105. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 33, at 175 (“The acquisition agreement provisions of greatest
interest to the shareholders ... are those dealing with the consideration.”); FREUND, supra note
16, at 147 (outlining the structure of a typical acquisition agreement); KLING & NUGENT,
supra note 19, § 1.05[1] (focusing on key deal provisions in an acquisition agreement).
II. BUSINESS COMBINATION AGREEMENTS AND THE ALLOCATION OF
DEAL RISK
Although the details of business combination agreements,
especially MAC clauses,101 are heavily negotiated,102 the general
form of a merger agreement between public companies is highly
standardized103 and quite long—often seventy or eighty single-
spaced pages excluding the schedules and annexes, which might
aggregate several hundred additional pages.104 A typical merger
agreement for a one-step transaction contains an article devoted to
defining terms, as well as an article that details the mechanics of
the merger, the form and amount of the merger consideration, and
the procedures for its payment.105 In a two-step transaction, this
article also treats the tender or exchange offer that the acquirer will
make for the shares of the target. Next, the agreement then
typically includes a very long article in which the target makes
representations and warranties to the acquirer concerning various
aspects of its business, such as its existence and good standing as a
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106. FREUND, supra note 16, at 229-80 (discussing representations and warranties of the
target); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[2] (discussing representations and
warranties).
107. FREUND, supra note 16, at 254-61 (discussing the “bring down” representation about
changes since the date of the financial statements); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[2]
(discussing representations and warranties).
108. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 42, at 1565 (discussing the seller’s representations
in the context of business combination agreements); POSNER, supra note 4, at 111-13
(discussing the seller’s representations to address the asymmetric information problem); Galil,
supra note 7, at 848 (discussing the seller’s representations in the context of business
combination agreements).
109. FREUND, supra note 16, at 281-85 (discussing representations and warranties of the
purchaser); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[2] (discussing representations and
warranties).
110. FREUND, supra note 16, at 281 (noting that a purchaser’s representations will be
significantly fewer than those of the seller, “covering such uncontroversial matters as the
purchaser’s due organization and (where stock is to be issued) capitalization, the non-
corporation, the authorization of the transaction and the consents
and approvals needed to effect it, the accuracy of the company’s
financial statements, the condition of its properties, the litigation it
is involved in, its compliance with relevant laws, and certain
matters related to taxes, employee benefit plans, intellectual
property, insurance coverage, and so on.106 Among these representa-
tions and warranties is generally a representation that the target
has not, since the date of its most recent audited financial state-
ments, suffered a MAC.107 For convenience, I shall refer to this
representation as the “MAC Representation” and thereby distin-
guish it from the definition of “Material Adverse Change,” which I
shall call the “MAC Definition,” and which may appear in the
definitions section of the agreement, in the same paragraph as the
MAC Representation, or elsewhere. To be clear, as I am using the
terms, the MAC Definition defines what a MAC is, whereas the
MAC Representation represents to the counterparty that the party
making the representation has not suffered a MAC after some
specified date.108
The next article of a typical merger agreement contains repre-
sentations and warranties that the acquirer makes to the target.109
In a cash deal, these representations are very brief. The acquirer
usually represents and warrants that it exists as a corporation in
good standing, has authorized the transaction, has the financial
capacity to pay the purchase price at closing, and little else.110
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assessability of any issuable shares, the authority of the purchaser to do the deal and the
binding nature of the agreement”).
111. FREUND, supra note 16, at 281 (stating that “if the transaction is for cash, the seller
doesn’t need many representations. He will be walking away from the closing with the money
in his hands, at which point his interest in the purchaser’s continuing financial condition or
prospects is relatively academic”).
112. See infra Part IV; see also infra Part IV tbl.1. As noted in Part IV, in some cash deals
the merger agreement contains a definition of “material adverse change” or “material adverse
effect” applicable to the acquirer that refers not to the business or financial condition of the
acquirer generally but merely to its ability to consummate the transaction. Such definitions
are obviously not attempting to capture the same kinds of changes generally at stake in MAC
Definitions, and they share none of the structure typical of MAC Definitions. They are thus
not relevant to discussion in the text and have been excluded from the sample of MAC
Definitions studied in Part IV.
113. FREUND, supra note 16, at 281 (stating that in “a merger between two public
companies of roughly equal size, the representations will be virtually the same for each
party”); LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 1.11[3] (noting that in a stock-for-stock
merger, there are usually reciprocal representations and covenants).
114. See infra Part IV tbl.1. As in some cash deals, some stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock
Because in a cash deal the shareholders of the target will have no
ongoing interest in the combined business, there is no reason for the
acquirer to make any other representations and warranties to the
target. In particular, the acquirer generally does not make any
representation about the condition of its business or that it has not
suffered a MAC.111 In a cash deal, therefore, only the target makes
a MAC Representation, and so the MAC Definition applies only to
a MAC on the target. Hence, as would be expected, in the 198 cash
deals studied in Part IV, all 198 contained MAC Representations by
the target to the acquirer, and virtually none contained MAC
Representations by the acquirer to the target.112
In stock-for-stock or cash-and-stock deals, on the other hand, the
shareholders of the target will become shareholders of the acquirer
and so will have an ongoing interest in the combined business. The
target is thus as interested in the acquirer’s business as the ac-
quirer is in the target’s. In stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals,
therefore, the acquirer usually makes representations and warran-
ties to the target that are substantially identical to those made by
the target to the acquirer,113 including a MAC Representation. As
shown in Table 1, in the 155 stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock
deals studied in Part IV, almost all contained MAC Representations
by both the target to the acquirer and the acquirer to the target (62
of 70 stock-for-stock deals and 77 of 85 cash-and-stock deals),114 and,
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deals contained definitions of “material adverse change” or “material adverse effect”
applicable to the acquirer that refer only to the acquirer’s ability to consummate the
transaction. As explained in footnote 112 supra, I have ignored these definitions as being
unrelated to the usual concept of a MAC.
115. See infra Part IV tbl.2.
116. See infra Part IV tbls.2-5.
117. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.04[1][c][ii].
118. See infra Part II.A-B.
as shown in Table 2, in 98 percent of these transactions, the MAC
Definitions (that is, the definition of a MAC on the target and the
definition of a MAC on the acquirer) were identical.115 As Tables 2,
3, 4, and 5 show in greater detail, in stock-for-stock and cash-and-
stock deals, even when the two MAC Definitions are not identical,
they are generally very similar.116
Now, provisions related to the mechanics of the transaction and
to the form and payment of the consideration, as well as representa-
tions and warranties by both acquirer and target, are found even in
agreements related to business combination transactions in which
signing and closing are simultaneous. When there is an interim
period between signing and closing, however, the parties face
additional problems related to the interim period that they attempt
to solve in the business combination agreement.117 These problems
are basically three: (a) the operation of the businesses of the parties
between signing and closing, (b) the conditions under which the
parties will have an obligation to close the transaction, and (c) the
allocation of risks arising during the interim period.118
A. Interim Covenants and Moral Hazard
As mentioned earlier, the acquirer always has an interest in the
business of the target, and in stock-for-stock deals and cash-and-
stock deals, the target has a similar interest in the business of the
acquirer. During the interim period, however, a party remains in
control of its own business. There is thus a moral hazard problem:
one party has control of the business, but that party bears either
none (in a cash deal, if the merger closes) or only some (in a stock-
for-stock or cash-and-stock deal, if the merger closes) of the risk
associated with the business and so will tend to run the business
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119. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 338-39.
120. FREUND, supra note 16, at 285-97; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[3].
121. FREUND, supra note 16, at 293-97 (discussing specific covenants); KLING & NUGENT,
supra note 19, § 1.05[3].
122. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[3].
123. Id.
124. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 1.11[3] (noting that reciprocal covenants are
common in stock-for-stock deals).
125. FREUND, supra note 16, at 153-61 (explaining relationships among representations,
covenants, and conditions), 297-301 (describing the function of closing conditions in
suboptimally.119 The contractual solution to this problem lies in so-
called interim covenants. In a cash merger, the target typically
promises that, between signing and closing, it will not take any of
a long list of prohibited actions.120 This list includes virtually every
conceivable action that could impair the value of the company, from
paying dividends or making other distributions to shareholders, to
incurring new indebtedness or other extraordinary obligations, to
entering into long-term contracts or contracts that would obligate
the company to pay more than a specified dollar amount, to creating
new employee benefit programs, or to changing its tax elections or
accounting practices.121 Such prohibitions on particular actions are
then backed up by another covenant (generally called the “ordinary
course” covenant) that the company will operate its business in the
ordinary course consistent with past practice, taking reasonable
steps to preserve its business and goodwill and its relationships
with customers, creditors, employees, and suppliers.122 Hence, even
an action not covered by the long list of prohibited actions may be
prohibited by the ordinary course covenant.123 In stock-for-stock and
cash-and-stock deals, the parties typically make identical (or at
least substantially reciprocal) interim covenants.124
B. MAC Representations and MAC Closing Conditions
The next problem related to the interim period is determining
when that period ends—in other words, under what conditions the
parties have an obligation to close the transaction. This problem is
solved by the closing conditions. For each party, the agreement
specifies a set of conditions precedent, the joint satisfaction or waiv-
er of which is necessary and sufficient for the party to have a legal
obligation to close the transaction,125 such as obtaining shareholder
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agreements); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[4].
126. FREUND, supra note 16, at 299-301 (discussing typical closing conditions); KLING &
NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[4].
127. FREUND, supra note 16, at 300 (discussing the receipt of tax rulings, listing on stock
exchanges, and effectiveness of securities registration statement); KLING & NUGENT, supra
note 19, § 1.05[4].
128. FREUND, supra note 16, at 299 (stating that “the first condition expressed in every
agreement is that ... all of the pre-closing agreements of the parties have been performed”);
KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[4].
129. The agreement thus embodies the general principle of contract law that a material
breach by one party relieves the other of its obligation to perform. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 8.15 (2d ed. 1990).
votes and required governmental approvals.126 In stock-for-stock or
cash-and-stock transactions, also typical are additional conditions
related to the SEC declaring effective a registration statement
related to the sale of the acquirer’s shares in the transaction, the
listing of the shares on the NYSE or Nasdaq, and the receipt by the
parties of opinions of counsel related to the tax aspects of the
transaction under the Internal Revenue Code.127
In both cash deals and deals involving stock, there also will be a
condition that each party’s obligation to close is conditional upon the
other party’s not having breached the agreement.128 The interaction
of this condition with the interim covenants is important. For if a
party breached an interim covenant (regardless of whether that
breach amounts to a MAC), the closing condition related to the
absence of breaches by such party would result in the counterparty’s
having no obligation to close the transaction. Hence, if a party
breaches an interim covenant, not only is the party liable for
damages for breach of contract, but the counterparty can walk away
from the deal without penalty.129 This is generally an effective way
of containing the moral hazard problem that the interim operation
of the business generates.
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130. But not absolutely always, for there are some business combinations that are done on
a “hell-or-high-water” basis. In such transactions, a party will have to close the deal even if
the counterparty’s representations and warranties are false at closing, including cases in
which the breaches thereof aggregate to a MAC. The best recent example is JP Morgan’s
acquisition of Bear Stearns. Because a major purpose of the transaction was to assure
financial markets of Bear’s continuing solvency, it would have obviously defeated the purpose
of the transaction if JP Morgan could have walked away from the deal if, between signing and
closing, Bear was MAC’d. See Agreement and Plan of Merger by and between The Bear
Stearns Companies, Inc. and JP Morgan Chase & Co., § 7.2(a) (Mar. 16, 2008) (showing that
JP Morgan’s obligation to close the merger related to the accuracy of representations of Bear
Stearns applied only to representations on capitalization, authority, brokers’ fees, and Bear’s
reception of a fairness opinion from its financial advisor at signing). For hell-or-high-water
deals generally, see Howard, supra note 2, at 223.
131. All representations and warranties made by the parties (whether by the target to the
acquirer or by the acquirer to the target, and including MAC Representations) are made as
of the signing. FREUND, supra note 16, at 153-55; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[2].
There is typically no promise that the representations will be true at any later date. The truth
of a party’s representations and warranties at closing is handled through the counterparty’s
closing conditions as explained in the text.
132. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[4].
133. The clause in parentheses is needed to handle the so-called double-materiality
problem. When a representation qualified to materiality is tested by a closing condition that
is also qualified to a MAC, there is a danger that, under each of several representations, there
may be facts or circumstances that would breach the representation if it were not so qualified
and that, when taken together, would aggregate to a MAC. In such a case, without the
language in the parenthetical, none of the representations would be breached at all, the
representations would thus be true to a MAC, the closing condition would be fulfilled, and the
counterparty would have to close—even though the company itself had in fact suffered a MAC.
See Adams, supra note 2, at 14-15.
134. See id. at 9, 11, 13-17 (explaining use of a MAC term in closing condition); Galil, supra
note 7, at 848 (distinguishing and explaining uses of MAC language in representations and
in closing conditions); Howard, supra note 2, at 222 (distinguishing MAC language in
Now, there will almost always130 also be, as a condition to the
acquirer’s obligation to close, a provision that the target provide a
certificate (usually to be signed by a specified senior executive
officer) to the effect that its representations and warranties are true
at closing—not simply true, as was required at signing,131 but true
(in the jargon of mergers and acquisitions lawyers) “to a MAC.”132
That is, the condition typically is that the representations and
warranties of the target (read without regard to any materiality or
MAC qualifications)133 are true, except for such failures to be true
as would not, in the aggregate, amount to a MAC on the target. For
convenience and in contradistinction to the MAC Definition and the
MAC Representation, I shall call this closing condition the MAC
Condition.134 Because parties intend and courts interpret the MAC
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representations from MAC language in closing conditions); Stephen R. Volk, Lewis H. Leicher
& Raymond S. Koloski, Negotiating Business Combination Agreements—The “Seller’s” Point
of View, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1124 (1996) (comparing use of MACs in representations
and closing conditions); Zerbe, supra note 7, at 19 (distinguishing use of MAC language in
representations and in closing conditions).
135. In the words of the leading case, a MAC must “substantially threaten the overall
earnings potential of the target in a durationally-significant manner.” In re IBP, Inc. S’holders
Litig., 798 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001); see also Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 355
(quoting IBP court’s assertion that a MAC must involve “a significant diminution of the value
of the business entity as a whole”); Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies,
10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 219, 242 (2002) (statement of panelist Rick Climan) (asserting that
a purported MAC has “got to be something pretty close to catastrophic before you can
comfortably advise a client to walk away and face the potentially horrendous liability
associated with making the wrong call on the issue”); Zerbe, supra note 7, at 19 (“Generally,
MAC clauses let the investors off the hook only if the adverse change approaches catastrophic
dimensions ....”).
136. In agreements involving private companies, the selling shareholders usually agree to
indemnify the acquirer postclosing for breaches of representations and warranties, whether
the breaches are discovered before or after closing. In public company deals, the transaction
costs of making selling shareholders parties to the agreement and of collecting from them if
there is a breach are prohibitive, and so public company agreements generally contain no
indemnification provisions. In such transactions, the costs of breaches not aggregating to a
MAC fall on the acquirer. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.05[5].
137. In Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. CIV.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 29, 2005), it was the nominal target in a mixed cash-and-stock deal, not the acquirer,
Definition to imply a very substantial impairment of the value of the
company as a whole,135 the representations and warranties of the
target can be untrue in quite important ways and nevertheless there
will be no MAC. In such cases, the closing condition will be fulfilled,
and the acquirer will have to close.136 Because the closing condition
determines whether a party has an obligation to close, it is actually
the MAC Condition that shifts deal risks between the parties.
In stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals, just as the represen-
tations and warranties and the interim covenants of the two parties
will be substantially reciprocal, including reciprocal MAC Represen-
tations and MAC Definitions, so too will the closing conditions be
substantially reciprocal. That is, there will be a MAC Condition in
favor of the acquirer, meaning that the acquirer will have no
obligation to close unless the target’s representations and warran-
ties are true to a MAC, and there will be a MAC Condition in favor
of the target, meaning that the target will have no obligation to
close unless the acquirer’s representations and warranties are true
to a MAC.137
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that declared a MAC and sought to exit the merger agreement because of an alleged MAC on
the acquirer.
138. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 334.
139. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 40-41 (Del. Ch. 2001).
140. In most such cases (including the Tyson-IBP merger agreement), agreements
containing such conditions also contain representations that are qualified not to materiality
but to MACs. See generally Adams, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining the use of MAC to qualify
individual representations). The net effect, at least insofar as closing conditions are
concerned, is the same as that of the typical merger agreement as described in the text. That
is, the effect is the same as having a closing condition that representations qualified to
materiality but read without regard to materiality qualifications are true to a MAC. The
reason is that a representation qualified to a MAC will be true under exactly the same
circumstances as the same representation qualified as to materiality but read without regard
to materiality qualifications will be true to a MAC.
141. See the classic discussion in FREUND, supra note 16, at 35-36.
142. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, §§ 1.05[2], 11.04[10].
Before going on to the typical MAC Definition, it is worth pausing
to note that, to the extent that scholars such as Gilson and Schwarz
have said that typical merger agreements have closing conditions
that require a target’s representations and warranties to be as true
at closing as they were signing,138 these scholars are generally
mistaken. It is possible to find merger agreements between public
companies that contain such a condition (indeed, the merger
agreement litigated in the Tyson-IBP transaction contained such a
condition,139 and this has, perhaps, misled academics), but such
agreements are unusual.140 The reason for this is well-known among
practitioners.141 Because the representations and warranties in a
typical merger agreement are usually very detailed, it is very likely
(even if the representations and warranties are qualified to
materiality) that one or more of them will be breached—that is,
cease to be true in some respect—between signing and closing. For
example, the litigation representation usually provides that all the
lawsuits pending against the target are listed on a schedule
attached to the agreement.142 If, between signing and closing,
another lawsuit is brought against the target, then this representa-
tion will be false at closing because the new lawsuit will not be
listed on the schedule. Hence, assuming the merger agreement
contains typical representations and warranties, a closing condition
to the effect that the representations and warranties be simply true
at closing would almost always be unfulfilled. The acquirer would
have no obligation to close the transaction, and the agreement
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143. See supra Part I.A.
144. See supra Part I.B.
145. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
would be converted into an option in favor of the acquirer. To avoid
this result, the closing condition in the typical merger agreement is
that the target’s representations and warranties are true to a MAC.
Hence, the condition is fulfilled unless one or more of the target’s
representations and warranties (including the MAC Representation)
are both breached (i.e., are false) and are breached to an extent that
the breach amounts to a MAC within the MAC Definition. In stock-
for-stock and cash-and-stock deals, the same is true about the
closing condition in favor of the target.
C. MAC Definitions in Public Company Merger Agreements
Thus far I have been describing the context in which MAC clauses
function. In particular, we have seen, first, that the non-simultane-
ity of signing and closing in large corporate acquisitions generates
deal risk, that is, the possibility of negative contingencies between
signing and closing that can affect the value of the deal to the
parties.143 Second, we have seen that the form of consideration paid
in the transaction is crucial to the allocation of deal risk.144 When
the consideration is cash, deal risk falls almost entirely on the
acquirer,145 for although negative contingencies can affect the value
of the target, as long as the acquirer is able to pay the purchase
price at closing, events between signing and closing will not
generally affect the desirability of the transaction to the target.146
Even if a superior offer for the company emerges, the target’s
shareholders can always vote down the original transaction in order
to pursue the better one.147 When, however, the merger consider-
ation is stock or a mix of cash and stock, both parties face the
problem of deal risk on approximately equal terms, for negative
contingencies arising between signing and closing can impair the
value of either business and so reduce the desirability of the
transaction from the point of view of either party.148 Third, we saw
that shareholder votes—always for targets and, when they have
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149. See supra Part I.B.1.
150. See supra Part I.A.
151. See infra Part IV tbl.1.
152. Adams, supra note 2, at 22 (arguing that, besides “change,” the nouns “event,”
“development,” “circumstance,” “effect,” and so forth., are “superfluous and [are] evidence of
lawyers’ penchant—generally misguided—for synonyms and near-synonyms”); Howard, supra
note 2, at 222 (discussing language used in this section of the definition).
153. Adams, supra note 2, at 42-43 (discussing aggregation language and how various
items can be aggregated under MAC clauses).
154. There is a significant difference between would and could here, and transactional
lawyers often argue the issue intensely. See Adams, supra note 2, at 15-16 (discussing would
them, for acquirers as well—limit deal risk by allowing the party’s
shareholders to cancel a deal (at the cost, at most, of a modest
termination fee), but only up until the time the vote is held.149
Fourth, negative contingencies arising from incumbent manage-
ment’s operation of the business during the interim period (target
management in all deals, acquirer management as well in stock-for-
stock and cash-and-stock deals) are effectively handled by interim
covenants.150 Put all these points together and the following working
theory should seem at least initially plausible: MAC Conditions are
meant to protect acquirers in all deals and targets in stock-for-stock
and cash-and-stock deals from negative contingencies arising after
signing (for parties without shareholder votes) or after a share-
holder vote (for parties with such votes), other than for deliberate
wrongdoing by counterparty management, which is dealt with in the
interim covenants.
With this working theory in mind, I turn to the empirical study
of MAC Definitions set forth more fully in Part IV below. That part
reports the results of a study of 353 business combination agree-
ments, classified by form of consideration (cash, stock-for-stock, or
cash-and-stock), and filed in the SEC’s EDGAR database between
July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008. The results151 will be unsurprising
to anyone familiar with current practices in the mergers-and-
acquisitions market in the United States. Virtually every agreement
in the sample had a definition of “material adverse change” (or
“material adverse effect”) that displayed the same basic structure.
Generally speaking, a MAC is defined as being any event, fact,
circumstance, development, or change152 that, either singly or in the
aggregate,153 would reasonably be expected (less commonly, “could
reasonably be expected”)154 to have a material adverse effect (a
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versus could, and stating that could “is very favorable to the non-representing party”).
Whether a proposition could reasonably be believed is clearly a different issue from whether
that proposition would reasonably be believed. At first blush, the former is a question of
whether some reasonable person could believe the proposition; the latter a question of
whether every reasonable person has to believe it. The difference between could and would
in a MAC Representation is thus potentially tremendous: It is the difference between having
to prove that there is reasonable disagreement about whether a MAC has occurred and having
to prove that there can be no reasonable view except that a MAC has occurred. See Frontier
Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *33 n.209 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29,
2005) (discussing would versus could). But see In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14
(Del. Ch. 2001). In this case, although the Tyson-IBP merger agreement defined a “Material
Adverse Effect” to mean “any event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or
facts which has had or reasonably could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect” on IBP,
id. at 65 (emphasis added), nevertheless Vice Chancellor Strine utterly ignored the could
language and speaks throughout the opinion as if the issue before him was whether IBP had
suffered a MAC, not whether it could reasonably have been expected that IBP had suffered a
MAC. For example, he says that “the question of whether IBP has suffered a Material Adverse
Effect remains a close one,” id. at 68, and ultimately concludes that “Tyson has not persuaded
me that IBP has suffered a Material Adverse Effect.” Id. at 71. Since Vice Chancellor Strine
admits that he is “torn about the correct outcome,” id., that the issue is “a close call,” id. at
68, and that he reaches his conclusion “with less than the optimal amount of confidence,” id.
at 71, the neglect of the could language seems to have affected the outcome of the case. If the
matter was as close as Vice Chancellor Strine says, then it would seem that the events to
which Tyson pointed, even if they did not MAC IBP, could reasonably have been expected to
MAC IBP. If so, Tyson should have won this case.
155. For a discussion of the seemingly innocuous phrase “taken as a whole,” see Adams,
supra note 2, at 34-35; Howard, supra note 2, at 245-46.
156. FREUND, supra note 16, at 260 (stating that buyer’s counsel should include “prospects,”
“if you can get away with it”); Galil, supra note 7, at 854-56 (discussing “prospects” as a
possible object of MAC); Howard, supra note 2, at 222 (claiming “prospects” is rare in
technology deals), 235 (noting inclusion of “prospects” is often a contentious issue); Toub,
supra note 5, at 867 (noting that inclusion of the term “prospects” is “rare”); Zerbe, supra note
7, at 30-31.
157. FREUND, supra note 16, at 260-61; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 11.04[9]; Adams,
supra note 2, at 29-35 (discussing objects to be listed in the definition of MAC); Howard, supra
note 2, at 223 (discussing various objects of a potential MAC). Adams argues that the usual
list of MAC Objects contains surplussage. “Little is to be gained by including both assets and
properties, and operations (as opposed to results of operations) should fall within the scope of
business,” for “otherwise one would be entitled to wonder what, if anything, business means.”
phrase not further defined) on various items (MAC Objects), which
usually include the business (91 percent of all MAC Definitions
studied), financial condition (98 percent), and results of operations
(85 percent) of the company and its subsidiaries taken as whole.155
Sometimes this list is expanded to include such things as the assets
(69 percent), liabilities (41 percent), condition (other than financial
condition) (33 percent), properties (29 percent), and prospects156 (19
percent).157
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Adams, supra note 2, at 31. Vice Chancellor Lamb, however, has recently answered this
doubt. In Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., No. Civ. A. 3841-VCL, 2008
WL 4457544, at *18 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 2008), he states that “the terms ‘financial condition,
business, or results of operations’ are terms of art, to be understood with reference to their
meaning in Reg. S-X and Item 7, the ‘Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations’ section of the financial statements public companies are
required to file with the SEC.” As the vice chancellor notes, in this section, companies disclose
current financial results along with pro forma financial results for the same period for each
of the previous two years, thus facilitating period-to-period comparisons. Id.
158. See Adams, supra note 2, at 45-46; Hall, supra note 7, at 1088-89 (discussing MAC
exceptions for terrorist attacks in wake of September 11); Galil, supra note 7, at 863-64
(discussing terrorism as an exception to MAC definitions); David Marcus, Material Change
Clauses Scrutinized After Sept. 11, 227 N.Y.L.J. 5 (2002); Toub, supra note 5, at 898 (noting
that, post-September 11, buyers may want to consider possible terrorist attack when writing
their MAC provisions); Warren S. de Wied, The Impact of September 11 on M&A Transactions,
M&A LAWYER, Oct. 2001, at 3-7; David J. Kaufman & Jane C. Hong, Post-Attack MAC, DAILY
DEAL, Dec. 13, 2001. Some acquirers determined that September 11 caused MACs on their
targets. See, e.g., Jaret Seiberg, USA Networks, National Leisure Settle, DEL. L. WKLY., Nov.
6, 2001 (discussing how the acquirer and target, which were involved in the travel industry,
terminated their merger agreement after September 11).
159. But see Howard, supra note 2, at 233 (discussing a little-used alternative to exceptions
from MAC definition).
160. See infra Part IV tbl.1.
From this definition, one or more exceptions (MAC Exceptions)
are then usually made, the most common of which relate to general
economic or business conditions (71 percent of all MAC Definitions
studied), industry conditions (68 percent), or financial market
conditions (51 percent); force majeure events like war (55 percent),
terrorism (54 percent),158 changes in law (61 percent) or generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (59 percent); or the an-
nouncement of the agreement and actions taken thereunder (75
percent).159 Less frequently there are also MAC Exceptions for
failures to meet internal financial projections (24 percent) or
estimates of industry analysts (25 percent).160 When such exceptions
are present, adverse changes to the company resulting from such
causes are not MACs within the meaning of the definition. In some
agreements, exceptions related to general economic, industry or
market conditions, or to force majeure events (or some of them) are
then further qualified so that events otherwise falling within the
exception (and so not counting as MACs) will nevertheless count as
MACs after all if they affect the company disproportionately relative
to some control group, such as other companies operating in the
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161. See Adams, supra note 2, at 43-44; Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 350; Howard,
supra note 2, at 225.
same industry (Disproportionality Exclusions).161 For instance,
under one common MAC Exception, a material adverse change on
the company resulting from an economic downturn will not count as
a MAC, but, if the exception has a Disproportionality Exclusion, the
economic downturn will count as a MAC if the downturn affects the
company disproportionately relative to its peer companies in the
industry. 
The structure of MAC Definitions, as revealed in the sample, is
set out in schematic form below:
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“Material Adverse Change” shall mean any event, fact, development, or circumstance
that, either singly or in the aggregate, has had or would (alternatively, could) reasonably
be expected to have, a material adverse effect on
MAC Objects: the company and its subsidiaries taken as a whole, or its
(a) business (BUS)
(b) financial condition (FIN-CON)




(g) condition, other than financial 
           condition (CON)
(h) operations (OPS)






other than such events, facts, developments, or circumstances
relating to
     
(a) General changes in the economy or economic or
          business conditions (ECO)
(b) General changes in conditions in financial, credit,
          debt, capital, or securities  markets (MARK)
(c) General changes in the industries or lines of
          business in which the party operates (INDUS)
(d) General changes in law or legal regulations (LAW)
(e) General changes in generally accepted accounting
           principles or other accounting matters (GAAP)
(f)  General changes in political or social conditions
          (POL)
(g) Acts of war or the outbreak or escalation of
          hostilities (WAR)
(h) Acts of terrorism (TERR)
(i) Natural disasters or acts of God, including hurricanes, 
           earthquakes, and tornadoes (NATDIS)
Indicator
Risks 
(j) Failures to meet financial projections prepared by
          the party itself (but not the underlying causes of
          any such failures) (PROJ)
(k) Failures to meet financial estimates prepared
           by industry analysts or other third parties (but
           not the underlying causes of any such failures)
           (ESTIM)
(l) Changes in the prices or trading volume of the
          party’s own securities (but not the underlying
          causes of any such changes) (PRICES)
Agreement
Risks
(m) Changes arising from the public announcement
            of the business combination agreement or the
            taking of any actions contemplated thereby or
            to which the counterparty consents (AGMT)
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162. See infra Part IV.
163. See infra Part III.B.
164. See infra Part IV.
The bold abbreviations in parentheses after the MAC Objects and
the MAC Exceptions correspond to the codes used in the tables in
Part IV.162 The italicized labels in the left-most column opposite
groups of various MAC Exceptions are from the classification
scheme for kinds of deal risk explained in Part III.B below.163 In
Part IV, there are tables setting forth the complete results of the
study, including data on the frequency of various MAC Objects and
MAC Exceptions in MAC Definitions classified by deal type (cash,
stock-for-stock, and cash-and-stock) and by party (target or
acquirer), as well as aggregate data across various kinds of deals
and more detailed data on the relationship between the two MAC
Definitions (on target and on acquirer) in stock-for-stock and cash-
and-stock transactions.164 I shall call attention to more particular
findings in the course of the argument below.
III. THE EFFICIENCY OF MAC CONDITIONS
Just as deal risk in business combinations is a particular example
of the general problem of delayed performance in contracts, so too
is the efficient allocation of deal risk between parties to business
combination agreements a particular example of the general
problem of efficiently allocating risk between contracting parties.
Hence, as might be expected, general considerations regarding the
efficient allocation of risk between contracting parties apply to the
allocation of deal risk in business combination agreements. For
example, we should expect that risks are allocated to cheaper cost
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165. Some risks are preventable. That is, for some risks, parties can take precautions to
ensure that the risk does not materialize. When the cost of taking such precautions is less
than the expected cost of the loss, it is efficient to take the precautions and forestall the risk.
If each of several parties can take precautions, one of them may have a cost advantage in
doing so; that is, they may be able to prevent the risk from materializing at a cost less than
the costs other parties would incur in so doing. In such cases, that party is the cheaper cost
avoider of the risk. In contractual situations, we would expect preventable risks to be shifted
to the contracting party that is the cheaper cost avoider of the risk because such an allocation
increases the joint surplus created by the contract and allows both parties to be made better
off. E.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 105-08; Richard Posner & Steven Rosenfield, Impossibility
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
166. Other risks are not preventable. That is, no party can take precautions against the
risk at a cost less than the expected cost if the risk materializes. Nevertheless, even though
the risk cannot be forestalled, one party rather than another may be the superior risk bearer
of the risk if, for example, the party can better (a) estimate the probability and magnitude of
the risk and in effect self-insure against it by pooling similar risks, (b) contract for insurance
against the risk on the commercial insurance market, (c) diversify against the risk, and so on.
As with risks for which there is a cheaper cost avoider, risks for which there is a superior risk
bearer are efficiently shifted to the party that is the superior risk bearer. E.g., POSNER, supra
note 4, at 105-08; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 165. In a hybrid situation, there are risks
that, though not preventable, are such that one party more cheaply than another can reduce
the magnitude of the loss caused by the materialization of the risk. For reasons analogous to
those in the case of risks for which there is a cheaper cost avoider or superior risk bearer, it
is efficient to shift risks to a party that has a cost advantage in cushioning the impact of
nonpreventable risks.
167. When parties have asymmetric information, they may estimate the expected cost of
a risk differently. If a party with superior information knows that the probability of a risk is
less than that estimated by a party with inferior information, the party with superior
information will bear a lower expected cost if it bears the risk, and so it is efficient for it to do
so. For example, despite its due diligence investigation of the target, the acquirer is always
somewhat uncertain about the state of the target’s business, and so it discounts the price it
is willing to pay to reflect the risk that the business is worse than it appears. The target,
however, knows more about its business than does the acquirer, and so in business
combination agreements targets typically make representations and warranties to the
acquirer about their business, thus assuming some of the risk the acquirer would otherwise
have to bear and so inducing the acquirer to pay a higher price. See generally, GILSON &
BLACK, supra note 42, at 1565; POSNER, supra note 4, at 111-13 (economic function of
representations generally); Galil, supra note 7, at 848-49.
avoiders,165 superior risk bearers,166 or parties with informational
advantages that allow them to determine that the expected cost of
a risk is low.167 To investigate the efficient allocation of deal risk, in
this Part I shall (a) consider some economic theories of MAC
Conditions offered in the literature, most importantly that of Gilson
and Schwartz, and show that they fail to explain why typical MAC
Conditions are efficient, especially when such conditions appear in
reciprocal form in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock merger
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168. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 346.
169. Shareholders with various hedging positions may have quite different interests. In the
simplest scenario, a target shareholder in a stock-for-stock merger can simply sell for cash the
shares of the acquirer that it receives in the merger, thus eliminating any interest in the long-
term fortunes of the acquirer’s business. Similarly, a target shareholder in a cash deal can use
the cash to purchase shares of the acquirer immediately postclosing (assuming the acquirer
is a public company), thus acquiring a long-term interest in the acquirer’s business. More
sophisticated hedging transactions can be arranged even preclosing that allow shareholders,
whether of the target or the acquirer, to arrange whatever set of upside and downside risks
they wish to bear. I think, however, that these possibilities ought best be ignored.
Management, which negotiates merger agreements, ignores them for the excellent reason that
different shareholders have different hedging strategies, most of which are unknown to
management and may change from day to day. Management thus behaves on the
straightforward assumptions made in the text and allows shareholders to design their own
agreements, and then (b) propose efficiency explanations for the
various provisions of the typical MAC Definition used in the typical
MAC Condition. As I shall show below, in many cases the alloca-
tions of risk made in MAC Conditions are efficient not because the
particular risk is being shifted to a cheaper cost avoider or superior
risk bearer, but because in shifting that risk, a different but related
risk created by the acquisition process itself is being wholly
eliminated. Only by taking account of this phenomenon can we
make economic sense of many of the provisions of typical MAC
Definitions.
A. Prior Theories of MAC Clauses
The two theories of MAC clauses in the literature are the so-
called Symmetry Theory and Gilson and Schwartz’s Investment
Theory. Both theories proceed on the assumption that MAC
Conditions exist to protect a buyer, who has a long-term interest in
the combined business, against a seller, who will receive a fixed
purchase price at closing and so has no such long-term interest. As
Gilson and Schwartz put it, the “payment of the price leaves the
seller indifferent to the value of the new enterprise.”168 In the
discussion below, I shall sometimes refer to this assumption as
the Asymmetry Assumption. Although true in cash mergers, the
Asymmetry Assumption is obviously false in both stock-for-stock
and cash-and-stock deals. In those transactions, both parties have
long-term interests in the combined business and both parties are
protected by MAC Conditions.169 As I shall show in greater detail
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portfolios as they see fit.
170. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 336 n.13.
171. See supra Part I.C.
172. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 336.
173. See id. 
below, because both the Symmetry Theory and Gilson and
Schwartz’s Investment Theory rely throughout on supposed dif-
ferences between the acquirer and the target following from the
Asymmetry Assumption, and because these differences do not
obtain in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals, most of what
both theories say about MAC clauses is clearly false. Moreover, I
shall argue that, even in the limited class of cases in which the
Asymmetry Assumption holds (i.e., cash mergers), neither the
Symmetry Theory nor the Investment Theory succeeds. In the
subsequent discussion, I shall generally divide my arguments
against these theories into two groups—first, arguments that accept
the Asymmetry Assumption arguendo, and then second, arguments
that turn on the falsity of that assumption.
1. The Symmetry Theory
The Symmetry Theory, which circulates among practitioners but
is not defended in the scholarly literature, begins from the
premise—generally untrue but consistent with the Asymmetry
Assumption—that targets, but not acquirers, get shareholder votes
on the transaction.170 The theory then notes that the triggering of a
target board’s Revlon duties in cash deals and the legal impossibility
even in stock-for-stock deals of creating binding lockups under
Omnicare make any merger agreement, in effect, a put option in
favor of the target.171 If a better offer comes along after signing, the
target will cancel the original deal and take the superior offer. The
effect is thus to assign by law the upside risk associated with the
target’s business to the target.172 According to the Symmetry
Theory, because the target invariably has the upside risk associated
with its business, the acquirer naturally demands compensation in
the form of allocating the downside risk associated with the target’s
business to the target as well.173 That allocation, it is said, is
accomplished through the MAC Condition: If the target is materially
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175. Id. at 336, 348.
176. See infra Part IV tbl.1.
177. An argument parallel to that in the text can be constructed on the basis of asset
purchase transactions as well—for instance, in a transaction in which the acquirer agrees to
purchase all the assets of the target and, in addition to the target, the shareholders of the
target are also parties to the asset purchase agreement. See generally COMM. ON NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS, SECTION OF BUS. LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT
WITH COMMENTARY (2001); KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 1.02[2].
adversely changed between signing and closing, the acquirer can
cancel the deal.174
There are several problems with this theory. As Gilson and
Schwartz note, if this theory is correct, then whenever an upside
risk with respect to the target’s business is assigned to the target,
the corresponding downside risk should also be assigned to the
target by the MAC Condition.175 But in fact all upside risks are
assigned to the target, because a target may take a better offer no
matter why the better offer emerges. For example, if the target
becomes more valuable during the interim period because of general
economic or market conditions and not because of anything peculiar
to the target itself, then the target may receive a superior offer and
so terminate the merger agreement. Hence, if the Symmetry Theory
were correct, given that upside risks from general economic and
market factors are assigned by law to the target, downside risks
arising from the same factors should be assigned to the target as
well in the MAC Condition. In fact, however, MAC Conditions often
assign to the acquirer many such risks, including risks arising
from general economic and market conditions and from various
kinds of force majeure events.176 Hence, the symmetry posited by the
Symmetry Theory does not exist.
The problems with the Symmetry Theory, however, are worse
than this. In fact, the theory is susceptible to outright falsification,
for there are business combination agreements in which the target
clearly does not have a put option. These are transactions structured
not as statutory mergers but as stock purchases between an
acquirer and the sole shareholder of the target, as when an acquirer
purchases all the shares of the company from its founder or when
one public company purchases all the shares of a subsidiary of
another.177 In such transactions, the shareholder is a party to the
2009] THE ECONOMICS OF DEAL RISK 2055
178. COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, SECTION OF BUS. LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY 1-2 (1995).
179. Unless, that is, the stock of the subsidiary being sold amounted to “all or substantially
all” of the selling corporation’s assets, in which case shareholder approval would be necessary.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1974); see also Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599,
607 (Del. Ch. 1974) (holding that stock of the subsidiary was not “substantially all” of the
corporation’s assets and so the sale did not require approval of the corporation’s shareholders
under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271).
180. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
181. MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra note 178, at 81-82 (discussing MAC
Representation in stock purchase agreements), 158-66 (discussing the acquirer’s closing
condition related to representations and warranties, including material adverse change
condition).
182. Purchase and Sale Agreement by and between ABN Amro Bank N.V. and Bank of
America Corporation, Apr. 22, 2007 (on file with the SEC as Exhibit 2.01 to Bank of America
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 26, 2007)), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/70858/000089882207000614/finalpurch.htm; see §§ 1.1 (defining “Material Adverse
Effect” on the business being transferred), 7.3(a) (MAC Condition of the acquirer’s obligation
to close the transaction). Although shareholders of ABN Amro sued the company arguing that
the sale of the subsidiary required the approval of the company’s shareholders, this argument
ultimately failed. Judge Allows LaSalle Bank Sale, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at C2 (noting
that the Netherlands Supreme Court ruled that ABN Amro did not need shareholder approval
in order to sell the LaSalle business to Bank of America).
183. There have even been litigated MAC cases arising out of such agreements. E.g., Pine
agreement,178 and there is no requirement for any additional
shareholder approval.179 Having legally bound itself to sell the
shares of the target in the stock purchase agreement, the share-
holder has no right to accept a better offer that might emerge later.
If the transaction requires non-simultaneous signing and closing
(for example, because it requires clearance under the HSR Act),180
the agreement will virtually always contain a MAC Condition in
favor of the acquirer that is substantially similar to those found
in other kinds of business combination agreements.181 A recent
example is the sale by ABN Amro Bank of an American subsidiary
(which included LaSalle National Bank) to Bank of America.182 In
such agreements, because the seller cannot cancel the deal, the
upside risk associated with the business being transferred is
assigned to the buyer, and, under the MAC Condition, the downside
risk associated with the business (other than risks covered by
MAC Exceptions, if any) is assigned to the seller. If the Symmetry
Theory were true, we would expect agreements related to such
transactions to contain no MAC Conditions at all. But, nearly
universally, they do.183
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State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., No. 98-2441, 1999 WL 1082539 (4th Cir. Dec.
2, 1999); Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Bollo, 421 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
184. See supra text accompanying note 174.
185. See Cicarella, supra note 5, at 429 (endorsing investment theory and stating that it
“offers the best explanation for the use of MAC clauses”). Based on the investment theory,
Cicarella argues that in deciding MAC cases, courts should interpret MAC Definitions,
including those that have no MAC Exceptions, as if all exogenous risks were assigned to the
acquirer. Id. at 447-50.
Finally, on the deepest level, the Symmetry Theory is simply the
wrong kind of theory in this context. The question is why it is
efficient to assign certain kinds of risk to one party rather than
another. The Symmetry Theory tries to answer this question by
saying that, because certain upside risks are assigned to the target,
the corresponding downside risks should be assigned to the target
as well.184 Despite its surface plausibility, there is nothing here to
show why the target can bear such risks more efficiently than can
the acquirer. Given that a certain upside risk is allocated by law to
the target, it may follow that the acquirer will demand compensa-
tion, but there is no reason to think that such compensation will
come in the form of assigning certain downside risks to the target.
For example, the purchase price in the transaction could simply be
adjusted downward. Assuming that the parties are economically
rational, risks will be assigned to the party able to bear them most
efficiently. Thus, if the acquirer is the more efficient risk bearer for
the downside risks, we should expect that these risks will be
assigned to the acquirer. And if that means that the target is getting
upside risks and the acquirer downside risks, then all can be made
right if the purchase price is adjusted downward by the right
amount. The Symmetry Theory does not even attempt to explain
why some parties can bear certain risks more efficiently than can
others, and so it is not even the right kind of theory if we are
inquiring into the efficient allocation of deal risk in business
combination agreements.
2. Gilson and Schwartz’s Investment Theory
Gilson and Schwartz, on the other hand, have the right kind of
theory.185 In their Investment Theory of MAC clauses, the risks
allocated by such clauses are divided into endogenous risks and
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186. See, e.g., id. at 429 (adopting endogenous-exogenous distinction); cf. Zerbe, supra note
7, at 17 (not relying on Gilson and Schwartz, but speaking of “dichotomy between changes
within the industry, and those within the firm itself”).
187. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 356.
188. Id. at 330.
189. Id. at 339.
190. Id. at 337. There are some important limits to such premerger integration. When the
parties to the merger are competitors, the federal antitrust laws will limit intercompany
coordination, an infraction known as “gun jumping” in antitrust. See Howard, supra note 2,
at 228 n.20.
191. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 337.
exogenous risks.186 Endogenous risks are risks peculiar to the
business of the target—risks “caused by actions the seller took or
failed to take.”187 Exogenous risks are risks arising from general
causes not peculiar to the business of the target and beyond the
ability of either buyer or seller to control, such as general economic
or market conditions, or general conditions in the industries in
which the target operates.188 Through MAC Exceptions, at least
some exogenous risks are shifted to the acquirer. All other risks are
assigned to the target. According to Gilson and Schwartz, “an
efficient acquisition agreement will impose endogenous risk on the
seller and exogenous risk on the buyer.”189 This account, I shall
argue, is wrong in almost all respects.
a. The Investment Theory: Endogenous Risks
The first problem with the Investment Theory’s account of the
allocation of endogenous risks is that, although endogenous risks
are defined widely enough to include all risks arising from acts or
omissions by the target during the interim period, Gilson and
Schwartz, in effect, limit their consideration to the target’s decisions
related to “mak[ing] relation-specific investments that will affect the
value of the combined company”190—that is, decisions about
investments connected to the particular relation of the target and
the acquirer. They identify three categories of such investments.
First, there are investments related to integrating the businesses of
the merging companies and preparing to capture postclosing
synergies.191 For example: 
2058 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2007
192. Id. In reality, it is quite unlikely that, prior to closing, a target would undertake
changes in its business that would significantly impair it on a stand-alone basis. The risk
that, for whatever reason, the deal does not close and the target may have to continue alone
would be simply too great to accelerate such changes ahead of the closing date. See Howard,
supra note 2, at 228 (“Sellers will generally resist changes that are either irreversible or may
cause irreparable harm, without a high degree of confidence or certainty that the deal will
close.”).
193. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 337; see also Howard, supra note 2, at 227
(discussing “employee attrition” and how mergers prompt more aggressive recruiting efforts
by competitors in high technology industries).
194. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 337; see also Fleischer, supra note 41, at 2.
195. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 337.
196. Id.; see also Howard, supra note 2, at 227 (noting that, especially when the merger
involves vertical integration, as when the acquirer is a large customer of the target and thus
[T]he target company may begin the process of integrating its
product line with that of the acquirer by suspending or canceling
development or improvement of products; may freeze investment
in capabilities that the acquirer already possesses; may shift its
research and development to fit the anticipated postclosing
strategic plan; and may discuss with its customers the buyer’s
capabilities in markets where the buyer has been a competi-
tor.192
Second, there are investments that the target can make to “retain
the cohesiveness of its workforce.”193 As Gilson and Schwartz
observe, 
the announcement of a friendly transaction could lead employees
to suspect layoffs or unwanted changes in the work environ-
ment. These expectations could cause more mobile, and likely
more valuable, employees to become less focused on the target
and more focused on their own futures, with the potential of an
adverse selection cascade.194 
The target, however, may be able to take various actions to elimi-
nate or at least to mitigate the adverse impact of the announcement
of the transaction on employee morale.195
Third, the target may make “efforts to preserve the profitability
of the new enterprise” because the target’s “customers and suppliers
may reconsider their relations with the target in anticipation of
the postclosing situation,” and “competitors may attempt to exploit
these uncertainties.”196 Hence, the failure of the target to make
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a competitor of the target’s other customers, customers may switch business away from the
target to other suppliers).
197. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 337.
198. According to Gilson and Schwartz, if the value of the seller increases sufficiently as
a result of such investments, it will be able to obtain an offer better than the offer from the
acquirer and will exit the deal, thus capturing part of the benefit of the investment. Id. at 335-
36. Hence, even absent a MAC Condition, the seller’s incentive to make such investments is
greater than zero. Although a minor point in the Investment Theory, this explanation is
probably wrong. For one thing, it is not very likely that investments specific to the business
combination of the target and acquirer will significantly raise the value of the target to other
potential buyers. In fact, making changes in product lines, research and development, and so
forth, could—unless the other potential buyer happens to be extraordinarily similar to the
acquirer—actually reduce the value of the target to the other potential buyer. A better
explanation as to why a target has some incentive to take actions that preserve the value of
its business is that it is contractually required to do so under the interim covenants of the
merger agreement, see text accompanying notes 119-24, and, if the transaction fails to close,
the target will have to continue as a standalone business.
199. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 338.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 339; see also id. at 344 (stating that “the fixed price contract insures the seller
against low realizations”), 346 (stating that “payment of the price leaves the seller indifferent
to the value of the new enterprise”).
investments related to postmerger integration, “to expend effort in
retaining a workforce and in preserving relations with customers
and suppliers in the sometimes lengthy interim between execution
and closing thus could materially reduce the value of the new
company.”197
In Gilson and Schwartz’s account, without a MAC Condition, the
target is insufficiently motivated to make such investments
because, although the costs of making the investment fall on the
target, the benefits are captured almost completely by the ac-
quirer.198 “Efficiency ... requires the seller to invest until the
marginal gain ... equals the marginal cost,”199 and without a MAC
Condition, “the seller will invest too little relative to the social
optimum because the seller has little interest in reducing the
likelihood of low realizations” (that is, reducing the likelihood that
the combined business will have lower value to the buyer at
closing).200 With a MAC Condition, “the effect ... is to reduce the
seller’s insurance [arising from the fixed purchase price promised by
the acquirer in the merger agreement] against low realizations. The
seller’s best response is to choose an investment level that is closer
to the social optimum.”201 The idea is that, if the MAC Condition
places risks to the target’s business related to these classes of
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202. However, investments in the first category generally do not get made at all prior to
closing. See supra notes 192-93.
203. See infra Part IV tbl.1.
204. Id.
investments on the target (that is, if the risks materialize, the
target will be MAC’d and the acquirer will walk away), then the
target will have a stronger incentive to make the relevant invest-
ments.
Now, it is undoubtedly true that targets rather than acquirers
are better able to make investments in the categories that Gilson
and Schwartz identify, and it is also undoubtedly true that such
investments tend to increase the value of the combined business
after closing. The function of MAC Conditions, however, is not to
motivate targets to make these investments. There is one overriding
reason and several lesser and related reasons for this. The overrid-
ing reason is that, with respect to the investments in all of Gilson
and Schwartz’s three categories,202 merger agreements generally
assign the relevant risks to the acquirer, not to the target. The risks
are simply not allocated the way Gilson and Schwartz think they
are. In fact, under the MAC Exception related to changes arising
from the announcement of the agreement and actions taken
thereunder, risks to the target’s relations with its employees,
creditors, customers, and suppliers arising from the merger, as well
as risks related to other actions taken pursuant to the agreement,
are assigned to the acquirer. As Table 1 in Part IV shows, for the
agreements studied, this was true in 79 percent of the cash deals
and, for targets, in 69 percent of the stock-for-stock deals and 76
percent of the cash-and-stock deals.203 Hence, because Gilson and
Schwartz are simply mistaken about how the relevant risks are
usually allocated, their explanation of the allocation cannot possibly
be right for the vast majority of cases.
Still, in a significant minority of merger agreements (21 percent
of cash deals, 31 percent of stock-for-stock deals, and 24 percent of
cash-and-stock deals),204 there is no MAC Exception for the target
related to changes arising from the public announcement of the
agreement. In this limited class of cases, therefore, the Investment
Theory could still be right. I do not think it is, however, and my
reasons for this can be organized in related groups. Some concern
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205. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
206. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 337.
207. For example, in Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical Co. v. Bollo, 421 F. Supp. 908, 930
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), the parties “hoped that the advent of [a new class of commercial airliners]
would mean greater business for [the target company], but it was business not yet existing
or within reach,” and so the “decision of the manufacturers to deal directly with the airlines
[and not with the target] took nothing from [the target] except great expectations.” That is,
in determining whether there had been a material adverse change, the court compared the
actual state of the company at two points in time: the time of signing and the time of closing.
It did not compare the actual state of the company at closing with a counterfactual state of
the company—for example, what the company would have been like had certain positive
developments occurred between signing and closing. In In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation., 789 A.2d 14, 66 (Del. Ch. 2001), Vice Chancellor Strine understood the required
inquiry similarly, stating that the relevant provisions of the merger agreement “require the
court to examine whether a MAE has occurred against the ... condition of IBP [as of the date
of the financial statements that IBP represented and warranted].” The points of
comparison—the actual state of the company at signing and actual state of the company at
closing—are the same in all the MAC cases. See, e.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v.
Huntsman Corp., No. Civ. A. 3841-VCL, 2008 WL 4457544, **15-20 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 2008);
the first class of investments, some concern the second and third
classes, and some are general to all three classes.
With respect to investments preparing to capture synergies
postclosing, failure to make these investments would, on the plain
meaning of a typical MAC Definition, never amount to a MAC.
By its express terms, the issue in determining whether a MAC
Condition is fulfilled is whether the company, at closing, is materi-
ally adversely changed (as defined in the MAC Definition) relative
to the state of the company at signing.205 Determining whether a
company has been MAC’d, therefore, requires a comparison of the
company at closing with the company at signing, not—as Gilson and
Schwartz would have it—a comparison between the company at
closing and what the company would have been like at closing had
it made certain investments related to merger synergies between
signing and closing, the benefits of which would be captured only
postclosing.206 
Gilson and Schwartz have simply misunderstood what the MAC
Condition means here. The comparison is between the actual state
of the company at closing with the actual state of the company at
signing, not between the actual state of the company at closing and
a counterfactual state in which it might have been had it taken
certain actions between signing and closing. All the reported cases
related to MAC Conditions confirm this.207 In none of these did the
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208. See generally cases cited supra note 207.
209. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 330, 338.
210. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 2, at 227 (discussing how some agreements provide for
“a package of inducements to encourage the retention” of key employees). For example, when
CapitalSource acquired Tierone, the parties agreed that Tierone would establish a retention
pool not to exceed $5,000,000 from which amounts would be awarded to employees of Tierone
as directed by CapitalSource in consultation with Tierone. See Section 6.7(f) of Agreement and
Plan of Merger, dated as of May 17, 2007, by and among CapitalSource, Inc., CapitalSource
TRS, Inc. and Tierone Corp., filed as Exhibit 2.1 in Form 8-K of CapitalSource, Inc. (May 23,
2007).
party declaring a MAC premise its claim on a supposed failure by
the counterparty to make investments related to capturing merger
synergies or, more generally, compare the state of the counterparty
at closing with the state in which that counterparty would have
been had it taken certain actions post-signing. On the contrary,
in each and every case, the party declaring a MAC has argued
that its counterparty had changed for the worse between signing
and closing.208 Indeed, that is just what it means to say that the
counterparty was materially adversely changed between signing and
closing.
With respect to investments to preserve the work force and
goodwill of the target’s business, although Gilson and Schwartz say
that “it is too costly to describe in the contract the full set of value
enhancing seller actions” that it would be efficient for the seller to
take,209 nevertheless, typical merger agreements contain both
standard-like and rule-like provisions that address exactly these
issues. As explained in Part II.A, the ordinary course covenant
requires the target to operate its business in the ordinary course
consistent with past practice and to take all actions reasonably
necessary to preserve its business and goodwill, and its relation-
ships with employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and others.210
If employee issues are especially important, merger agreements will
often contain specifically negotiated provisions that allow a party to
pay employees cash retention bonuses if they continue with the
company, either through the closing or for some specified period
thereafter.211 The rule-like interim covenants specifically prohibit
2009] THE ECONOMICS OF DEAL RISK 2063
212. See supra text accompanying notes notes 119-21; see also infra Part IV tbls.1-5.
213. See supra text accompanying notes notes 119-21; see also infra Part IV tbls.1-5.
214. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
215. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001); see also Gilson &
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 355 (quoting the IBP court’s assertion that a MAC must involve
“a significant diminution of the value of the business entity as a whole”); Symposium,
Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 219, 242 (2002)
(statement of panelist Rick Climan) (asserting that a purported MAC has “got to be something
pretty close to catastrophic before you can comfortably advise a client to walk away and face
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Zerbe, supra note 7, at 19 (“Generally, MAC clauses let the investors off the hook only if the
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various actions that would impair the value of the business between
signing and closing.212 If a target failed to observe the ordinary
course covenant, or if it took some action prohibited by one of the
specific covenants, the acquirer could immediately sue and, at least
with respect to the negative covenants, would likely be able to
obtain an injunction ordering the target to comply with the merger
agreement.213 More important, the acquirer could also declare that
the breach of the covenant implies that the closing condition
requiring such covenants not be breached will be unfulfilled, thus
relieving the acquirer of its obligation to close the transaction and
allowing it to walk away.214
By contrast, if the acquirer attempted to exit the merger agree-
ment in reliance on the MAC Condition by arguing that the target’s
acts or omissions had MAC’d the company, the acquirer would
usually find it difficult to prevail. The reason is that interim
covenants concern issues that, in the overall context of the deal, are
of relatively small dollar value, and so protect the acquirer against
even relatively minor deliberate actions by the target. For example,
in the sale of a billion-dollar business, it would be common to see
an interim covenant that prohibited the target from increasing
the compensation of any employee whose annual compensation
exceeded, say, $100,000. The dollar amounts at stake in breaching
such a covenant would usually be trivial in relation to value of the
deal. The MAC standard as commonly understood, however, applies
only to very substantial diminutions in the value of the business.
In the words of the leading case, a MAC must “substantially
threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in a dura-
tionally-significant manner.”215 
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Hence, the vast majority of actions prohibited by interim
covenants, although of obvious importance to the parties, would not
by any stretch of the legal imagination amount to MACs. For
instance, doubling the compensation of most of the senior employees
of the company would certainly breach the interim covenants and
allow the acquirer to walk away,216 but it would certainly not MAC
the company. As a result, if an acquirer relied on the MAC clause to
ensure the good behavior of the target during the interim period, a
target could take a variety of actions that would harm the acquirer
and could also allow its business to deteriorate significantly without
fear that the acquirer could declare a MAC. It is to prevent just such
behavior that merger agreements contain interim covenants and
closing conditions based on their fulfillment.
There is even more wrong with Gilson and Schwartz’s argument
here. Gilson and Schwartz implicitly assume that, by failing to
preserve the value of the business, the target is made better off by
avoiding a cost. This is not actually the case. If the target’s manag-
ers fail to make certain investments between signing and closing,
the cash that the target would have spent in making such invest-
ments will remain in the corporation because the interim covenants
invariably prohibit paying extraordinary dividends or making other
distributions to shareholders.217 At closing, the money will become
the property of the acquirer. Therefore, assuming the merger closes,
any amounts saved by not investing in preserving the target’s
business ultimately accrue to the acquirer, not the target or its
shareholders. It follows then that the target and its shareholders in
no way benefit if the target neglects its business during the interim
period; in fact, they would have only the downside risk of owning an
impaired business if the transaction fails to close. As for the target’s
managers, if the transaction closes, then they (except for any who
lose their jobs in the merger) will become employees of the acquirer.
They thus have very strong personal incentives to act during the
interim period as the acquirer would want (and even managers
losing their jobs in the merger have reputational interests at stake
in performing competently). Furthermore—and here I revoke the
Assymetry Assumption thus far conceded arguendo—in stock-for-
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stock and cash-and-stock transactions, because both parties will
have an interest in the combined business postclosing, both parties
have strong economic incentives to preserve the value of the
business between signing and closing. In short, there is virtually no
reason to think that MAC Conditions are concerned with invest-
ments that the target can make preclosing related to capturing
merger synergies, maintaining employee morale, or preserving the
target business. The Investment Theory’s account of the allocation
of endogenous risks is wrong in virtually all respects.
b. The Investment Theory: Exogenous Risks
“Neither party,” say Gilson and Schwartz, “can affect whether an
exogenous risk will materialize,”218 such as a general economic
downturn, or market or industry conditions that affect firms
generally. Nevertheless, a “risk whose materialization cannot be
prevented should be assigned to the party who has the appropriate
incentive to take value insuring or value preserving actions,”219 such
as the party that can best cushion the effect of the risk. The effects
of exogenous risks “likely extend[ ] beyond the interim between
signing an acquisition agreement and closing the deal” and “the
effect of typical buyer responses—for example, positioning the
company for an economic upturn—ordinarily would be realized
after the deal closes.”220 Given that the “payment of the price leaves
the seller indifferent to the value of the new enterprise” (i.e., the
Asymmetry Assumption), “[t]he seller would have little incentive to
ameliorate those risks.”221 “In contrast,” Gilson and Schwartz argue,
the buyer does have an incentive to take actions in the interim
between signing and closing that would affect risks that
materialize largely after closing. This is partly because the
buyer can capture the full gain from actions whose effects will be
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realized after the seller is paid [and partly because] the buyer
can coordinate the responses across both companies.222
 
Hence, with respect to exogenous risks, the “buyer is the more
efficient risk bearer,”223 and “an efficient acquisition agreement
would impose on the buyer those exogenous risks whose impact
would be felt largely after the buyer takes control of the new
enterprise.”224
But even maintaining arguendo the Asymmetry Assumption,
Gilson and Schwartz’s explanation here is circular. We are being
told that MAC Conditions allocate exogenous risks to the acquirer
because the acquirer is the superior bearer of such risks, and that
the acquirer is the superior bearer of such risks because it is the
long-term owner of the business.225 The acquirer is the long-term
owner of the exogenously MAC’d business of the target, however,
only because the MAC Condition allocates exogenous risks to the
acquirer. If the MAC Condition allocated such risks to the target,
the acquirer would declare a MAC and never become the owner of
the business. The explanation therefore comes to this: the acquirer
is the superior bearer of exogenous risks because the MAC Condi-
tion allocates such risks to the acquirer, thus giving the acquirer an
incentive to respond to them as they materialize. 
This confuses cause and effect. The futility of this mode of argu-
ment becomes apparent if we consider what Gilson and Schwartz
could say if MAC Conditions allocated exogenous risks to the target.
If that were the case, Gilson and Schwartz could say that the target
would then be the long-term owner of its exogenously MAC’d
business, and it, rather than the acquirer, would be better placed to
take actions responding to such risks, and so it, rather than the
acquirer, would be the superior bearer of exogenous risks. Clearly,
such arguments prove nothing.
Put another way, Gilson and Schwartz are saying that exogenous
risks should be shifted to the party that has an incentive to deal
with them.226 But because the incentive to deal with exogenous risks
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comes with the long-term ownership of the business, it follows that
whichever party is the long-term owner of the business will (at least
so far as incentives go) be the superior bearer of exogenous risks. It
is the MAC Condition itself that determines which party will be the
long-term owner of an exogenously MAC’d business, and so this
observation about incentives following ownership of the business
tells us nothing about how exogenous risks should be allocated. The
party on which the MAC Condition places the risk will for that very
reason have an incentive to deal with the risk. What we are looking
for, however, is a reason, independent of the allocation of risks in
the MAC Condition, for thinking that one party rather than another
will be the more efficient risk bearer. That kind of reason—the only
kind that matters here—is not supplied by Gilson and Schwartz’s
account.
Furthermore, we have to consider what becomes of Gilson and
Schwartz’s explanation of the allocation of exogenous risk when we
revoke the Asymmetry Assumption. As explained in Part I, although
the assumption is correct in cash deals, it is false in stock-for-stock
and cash-and-stock deals. Moreover, as explained in Part II.C, just
as in cash deals there is a MAC Condition with respect to the target,
so in stock-for-stock deals and cash-and-stock deals, there are two
MAC Conditions, one in favor of each party to the merger. As is
apparent from the tables in Part IV,227 the MAC Definitions in
stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock agreements are substantially
reciprocal.228 In particular, as shown in Table 2, in 98 percent of all
stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals containing MAC Defini-
tions for both target and acquirer, the definitions are reciprocal, and
as shown in Table 3, even if we count those few stock-for-stock and
cash-and-stock deals in which there is no MAC Definition applicable
to the acquirer, the definitions are reciprocal in 88 percent of the
deals.229 Further, MAC Exceptions in the definitions of MAC on the
target and MAC on the acquirer in such deals appear with similar
frequency. For example, as shown in Table 1, for stock-for-stock
deals, there were MAC Exceptions for general economic conditions
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for 70 percent of targets and 69 percent of acquirers, for changes in
law for 57 percent of targets and 58 percent of acquirers, and for
terrorism for 47 percent of targets and 45 percent of acquirers.230
For cash-and-stock deals, there were MAC Exceptions for general
economic conditions for 62 percent of targets and 60 percent of
acquirers, for changes in law for 64 percent of targets and 65
percent of acquirers, and for terrorism for 49 percent of targets and
52 percent of acquirers.231 The combined effect of these provisions is
that, in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals, targets and
acquirers use MAC Exceptions to temporarily swap exogenous risks
during the interim period—that is, the acquirer is bearing exoge-
nous risks of the target and the target is bearing exogenous risks of
the acquirer.
This fact falsifies the Investment Theory’s account of the allo-
cation of exogenous risks. The Investment Theory implies that,
when reciprocal MAC Conditions in stock-for-stock and cash-and-
stock deals swap exogenous risks between the parties, each party is
the superior risk bearer of the other party’s exogenous risks. For
example, the merger agreement in the Delta-Northwest stock-for-
stock merger232 contains one definition of “Material Adverse Effect”
applicable to both Delta and Northwest, and includes various MAC
Exceptions related to exogenous risks233 as well as reciprocal MAC
Conditions.234 The Investment Theory asks us to believe that, during
the period between signing and closing, Delta is better able to deal
with exogenous risks related to Northwest, and Northwest is better
able to deal with exogenous risks related to Delta. Similarly, the
Investment Theory asks us to believe that, when Bank of America,
a company with a market capitalization in excess of $170 billion,
agreed to acquire in a stock-for-stock transaction Countrywide
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Financial, a deeply troubled company with a market capitalization
of less than $5 billion,235 Countrywide is somehow better able to deal
with the exogenous risks associated with Bank of America during
the interim period than is Bank of America itself.236 The implica-
tions of the Investment Theory about the Delta-Northwest deal are
highly implausible; those about the Bank of America-Countrywide
deal are simply absurd. Hence, the Investment Theory does not
explain the allocation of exogenous risks in MAC Conditions in
stock-for-stock or cash-and-stock merger agreements.
Furthermore, as the results set forth below in Table 1 in Part IV
demonstrate, merger agreements in cash deals tend to use MAC
Definitions very similar to those in stock-for-stock and cash-and-
stock transactions.237 Assuming that the same efficiency rationales
underlie these similar allocations of risk, if Gilson and Schwartz’s
Investment Theory is wrong with respect to the allocation of
exogenous risks in stock-for-stock and cash-for-stock mergers, which
it clearly is, then the Investment Theory is also very likely wrong in
the case of cash mergers too.
Finally, Gilson and Schwartz speak as if merger agreements
typically assign all exogenous risks to the acquirer.238 As the tables
in Part IV show, this is not right.239 Few merger agreements contain
MAC Exceptions for all kinds of exogenous risks. The most we can
say is that, in a large majority of merger agreements, some exoge-
nous risks are allocated to the acquirer. For example, even with the
class of exogenous risks most frequently allocated to counterparties
(risk from general economic conditions), such risks are allocated to
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counterparties in only 71 percent of the agreements in the sample
(considering all deal types together, including definitions of both
MACs on targets and MACs on acquirers).240 For other kinds of
exogenous risks, the numbers are much lower (for example, industry
conditions, 68 percent; law, 61 percent; GAAP, 59 percent; war, 55
percent; terrorism, 54 percent) and in some cases significantly lower
(political conditions, 38 percent; natural disasters, 24 percent).241 In
short, different agreements will select different exogenous risks to
shift to the counterparty, and in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock
deals, parties may shift different exogenous risks to each other.242
Virtually all merger agreements leave certain exogenous risks—and
often many such risks—on the party itself.243 It will not do, there-
fore, to say that acquirers are superior bearers of exogenous risks
because this does not explain why parties commonly leave some
exogenous risks on the party itself. Any complete theory of the
allocation of deal risk in MAC Conditions must explain why,
although some kinds of exogenous risk are more-often-than-not
assigned to counterparties, some kinds of such risks are so assigned
in only a significant minority of cases, and the exact kinds thus
assigned varies significantly from transaction to transaction.
B. The Efficient Allocation of Risk in MAC Conditions
The first step in working out an adequate theory of the efficient
allocation of deal risk in MAC Conditions is to classify the various
kinds of risks specified by the typical MAC Definition in a manner
more nuanced than the endogenous-exogenous distinction used by
Gilson and Schwartz. As explained above, the typical MAC Defini-
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tion contains some selection of MAC Exceptions that assign certain
kinds of risk to the counterparty, whereas the risks associated with
MAC Exceptions not included in the MAC Definition stay with the
party itself, as do all the risks that fall outside all of the MAC
Exceptions.244 Any classification of the risks allocated by MAC
Conditions, therefore, should begin with the kinds of risks specifi-
cally described in MAC Exceptions, properly characterize these
risks, and then formulate a description of the risks left over when
the risks allocated in all the common MAC Exceptions are sub-
tracted.
As appears from Table 1 in Part IV, the kinds of risk commonly
allocated to counterparties in MAC Exceptions are risks relating to
(a) general changes in the economy or in economic or business
conditions (71 percent of all MAC Definitions in the sample), (b)
general changes in financial, credit, debt, capital, or securities
markets (51 percent), (c) general changes affecting the industries or
lines of business in which the party operates (68 percent), (d)
changes in law (61 percent), (e) changes in GAAP (59 percent), (f)
general changes in political or social conditions (38 percent), (g) acts
of war (55 percent), (h) acts of terrorism (54 percent), or (i) natural
disasters (24 percent).245 These I shall call “systematic risks,”246
their defining feature being that their materialization is beyond the
control of all parties (even though one or both parties may be able
to take steps to cushion the effects of such risks) and that they will
generally affect firms beyond the parties to the transaction. 
Second, in a significant minority of cases, there are allocated to
counterparties via MAC Exceptions what I shall call “indicator
risks.” These include risks that the company will not meet its own
financial projections (shifted from targets to acquirers in 33 percent
of cash deals; from targets to acquirers in 14 percent of stock-for-
stock and 24 percent of cash-and-stock deals; and from acquirers to
targets in 15 percent of stock-for-stock and 19 percent of cash-and-
stock deals) or the financial estimates of industry analysts (shifted
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to acquirers in 34 percent of cash deals; from targets to acquirers in
19 percent of stock-for-stock deals and 18 percent of cash-and-stock
deals; and from acquirers to targets in 19 percent of stock-for-stock
and 18 percent of cash-and-stock deals), or that the company’s
securities will trade at lower prices (shifted from targets to acquir-
ers in 30 percent of cash deals; from targets to acquirers in 23
percent of stock-for-stock deals and 22 percent of cash-and-stock
deals; and from acquirers to targets in 29 percent of stock-for-stock
and 31 percent of cash-and-stock deals).247 The defining feature of
these risks is that, although their materialization may be an
indication or evidence that the value of the company has been
impaired, the materialization of an indicator risk does not by itself
impair that value.
Third, there are the risks resulting from the announcement of
the agreement and actions taken by the parties thereunder. These
include the kinds of risks Gilson and Schwartz placed in their
second and third categories of endogenous risks—disruptions
arising from the merger of the company’s relationships with
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and others with whom
it does business—as well as damage to the business arising from
diversion of management’s time and attention by the acquisition
process.248 As is apparent from Table 1, such risks are shifted from
targets to acquirers in 79 percent of cash deals, 69 percent of stock-
for-stock deals and 76 percent of cash-and-stock deals, and from
acquirers to targets in 69 percent of stock-for-stock deals and 73
percent of cash-and-stock deals.249 Such risks I shall call “agreement
risks.” The defining feature of agreements risks is that, although
peculiar to the parties themselves, the risk arises not from the
ordinary operations of a party’s business, nor from general factors
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beyond the control of the parties, but precisely from the business
combination transaction contemplated by the agreement.250
All other kinds of risks—risks not allocated in MAC Exceptions
and so remaining with the party itself—I shall call “business risks.”
Because of the drafting conventions used in MAC Definitions—all
the risks are on the party except for those shifted to the counter-
party by the MAC Exceptions—this class of risks would, strictly
speaking, probably be best defined negatively. That is, we could say
that these risks include everything other than systematic risks,
indicator risks, and agreement risks to the extent that such risks
are shifted to the counterparty. As we shall see below, however, the
paradigm examples of such risks will be risks arising from the
ordinary operations of the party’s business (other than systematic
risks), and over such risks the party itself usually has significant
control.251 For this reason, I think it is more helpful to denominate
this class of remaining risks as “business risks.”
The problem is thus to explain why (a) systematic risks and
agreement risks are usually, but not always, shifted to the
counterparty, (b) indicator risks are so shifted in a significant
minority of cases, and (c) business risks are virtually always
assigned to the party itself.
1. Systematic Risks
I assume that because systematic risks are often allocated to
counterparties in both cash deals as well as stock-for-stock and
cash-and-stock deals using substantially identical language,
whatever makes it efficient for counterparties to bear such risks in
deals involving stock also makes it efficient for counterparties to
bear such risk in cash deals. It thus seems reasonable to proceed by
considering the more difficult case first, that is, to investigate the
allocation of such risks in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals.
In such transactions, the parties have substantially similar long-
term interests in the combined business, and neither is able to affect
the likelihood that systematic risks will come to pass. To the extent
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that the parties can cushion the long-term effects of systematic
risks, it seems obvious that each is better able to do so with respect
to its own business, and yet the parties often use reciprocal MAC
Conditions to, in effect, swap systematic risks during the period
between signing and closing. Why is this efficient?
The answer lies in recognizing that, during the interim period,
there is usually very little either party can do, not only to prevent
systematic risks from materializing, but even to cushion the long-
term effects of those risks. Moreover, both parties to a merger
agreement will likely do whatever can be done to cushion the effects
of systematic risks regardless of which of them contractually bears
them. In stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals, regardless of how
systematic risks are allocated in the agreement, each party has a
long-term interest in its own business (if the deal does not close) and
in both businesses (if the deal does close). In a cash deal, the
acquirer will have a long-term interest in its own business regard-
less of whether the deal closes and will have an interest in the
target’s business if the deal closes. Even the target has an incentive
to do what it can to cushion systematic risks because, regardless of
whether the deal closes, such cushioning is required to preserve its
business under the ordinary course covenant, and, as explained
earlier, its managers often have personal incentives to cause the
company to live up to this obligation. Hence, without regard to risk
allocations in MAC Conditions, parties in stock-for-stock, cash-and-
stock, and even cash deals will likely act to cushion materializing
systematic risks. Whatever reciprocal MAC Conditions allocating
such risks to counterparties in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock
deals are doing, therefore, they are not shifting systematic risks
from a party less able to a party better able to deal with them.
The economic purpose of such MAC Conditions must, therefore,
be something quite different. My contention is that, by shifting a
systematic risk from one party to another, MAC Conditions in fact
eliminate a different risk arising from that systematic risk during
the acquisition process. By shifting a systematic risk of a party to
the counterparty during the interim period, the MAC Condition
safeguards the party against the risk that its counterparty will,
either honestly or opportunistically, declare a MAC on it on the basis
that the systematic risk has materialized. It is critical here to
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distinguish these two risks—the underlying systematic risk, on the
one hand, and the risk that a counterparty will declare a MAC on
the party on the basis that the systematic risk has materialized, on
the other. The former is a risk arising from factors affecting firms
generally; the latter is a risk arising from the business combination
transaction between the parties. For example, a party always faces
the systematic risk of an economic downturn, but it is only when a
business combination is pending that the party faces the risk that
its merger partner will declare it has been MAC’d on the basis of an
economic downturn. If this latter risk materializes, then not only
does the party suffer whatever harm it would otherwise have
suffered from the economic downturn, but it also suffers the
additional harm of having the fact of the underlying harm being
publicly attested to by its merger partner.
Put another way, during an economic downturn, the business of
a great many firms will be impaired, but only those involved in
pending business combinations risk having to debate in public—and
perhaps in court, if litigation ensues—whether the degree of harm
they are suffering during the downturn rises to the level of a MAC.
If the counterparty successfully cancels the deal (either because the
party acquiesces in the declaration of a MAC because it believes it
cannot successfully litigate the matter, or because the party litigates
the matter and loses), then there is a public certification that the
company is, in effect, damaged goods. An analogy will help: on the
personal level, there is a big difference between being down on your
luck and having your fiancée announce that fact in church and leave
you at the altar. Both impair your prospects on the dating market,
but the latter is clearly much worse.
How does public attention to a company being MAC’d make
being MAC’d worse? In many ways.252 As one group of experienced
practitioners has put it: “Investors will view the [company] as
‘damaged goods’ if the merger fails as a result of a MAC, causing the
[company] to lose alternative opportunities. In some instances, the
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[company] will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the deal fails as a
result of a material adverse change.”253 And it is not just investors
who will view the company skeptically: lenders, employees,
landlords, trade creditors, customers, and others with whom the
company deals will question the wisdom of doing business with the
company.254 Put another way, assuming that there are alternatives
available in the market, who would want to invest in, lend money
to, sell on credit to, insure, work for, or buy from a company that
has just been declared to be MAC’d? Such a company is obviously
placed at a serious competitive disadvantage in virtually all of the
markets in which it operates.
Capital markets may well be highly efficient and impound into
prices all information publicly available, and so it may seem that,
if a company really is MAC’d, at least the investing community
would already know this and the counterparty’s public declaration
of the MAC would add nothing. This, however, is not so. The
counterparty’s declaration of a MAC substantially changes the
mix of information publicly available about the company.255 Most
importantly, it introduces into the market a person—the counter-
party declaring a MAC—who is publicly known to have inside
information about the party256 and who is now publicly declaring
that the party has been MAC’d. This is much worse for the company
than a major investor simply selling off its shares in the company.
Moreover, especially if litigation results, the counterparty will
publicly disclose negative information about the company that
would likely have remained confidential or at least not have been
released in the context of an argument that the company has been
MAC’d. In reported MAC litigations, the dispute between the
parties has often led to the public disclosure of such ordinarily
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confidential information as disappointed expectations about possible
sales,257 adverse comments from the SEC on a party’s securities
filings and financial statements,258 disappointing internal financial
information,259 estimates of litigation costs and potential litigation
liabilities from a mass toxic tort,260 and details of problems with new
information and accounting systems.261 Indeed, in the Johnson &
Johnson-Guidant transaction, when Johnson & Johnson declared a
MAC on Guidant, Guidant’s directors were willing to renegotiate the
purchase price because they feared that a lawsuit to enforce the
original agreement would further damage the company’s business
and reputation.262 And, of course, in disclosing information about the
company, the counterparty declaring a MAC has every incentive to
put the worst construction on every piece of information, to conceal
positive information, to exaggerate the party’s problems, and, at the
extreme, even to lie about the state of the company.263 Once a
counterparty has declared a MAC, it has every incentive to make
the impairment of the party’s business appear as severe as possible,
even to make it appear worse than it really is.
Furthermore, all firms operate in many markets that are not as
efficient as capital markets, and so a public debate and possible
litigation on the question of whether a company has been MAC’d
not only generates much negative public information that would
otherwise never have been generated, but it also makes this
information available to—indeed practically forces it upon—persons
who would otherwise likely not have been attentive (or as attentive)
to the state of the company. Simply put, when a merger between
public companies blows up because one company has declared a
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MAC on the other, it is big news in the business world. Hence,
persons with whom the company deals but who otherwise might
know and worry little about the state of the company will suddenly
receive much information (including some of questionable
accuracy)264 that tends to show that the company is significantly
impaired. The company’s relationships with its employees, suppli-
ers, and customers (many of which will have already been strained
merely by the public announcement of the merger)265 will all be
further damaged. Employees will worry more about the security of
their jobs,266 and some will seek employment elsewhere, with the
best and most valuable employees being the most mobile. Suppliers
may worry about extending trade credit to the party and start
demanding payment in cash. Customers, concerned that a major
vendor may be floundering, may consider diversifying their supply
chains and switching some or all of their business to alternative
sources.267 If the business is one in which long-term relationships
are important, customers may delay placing orders until they know
whether the party will be around in the long term. Rating agencies
may consider downgrading the company’s securities. And the
party’s competitors, of course, will fully exploit the opportunity to
poach its best employees and steal the company’s customers. The
counterparty’s declaration of a MAC can very well start a negative
cascade that can bankrupt even a healthy company. Indeed, for a
public company, being declared MAC’d is something of a doomsday
scenario.
The risk of public attention and possible public certification of
being MAC’d by a materializing systematic risk can be wholly
eliminated, however, if the underlying systematic risk is shifted via
a MAC Exception to the counterparty. When the counterparty bears
the party’s systematic risk, the counterparty will never declare a
MAC based on such risk even if the risk materializes. Such a
declaration would not only be useless in avoiding the transaction
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but it would also amount to admitting in public that the pending
transaction has worked out badly for the counterparty—specifically,
that it has grossly overpaid. By shifting the underlying systematic
risk to the counterparty, the MAC Exception gives the counterparty
a strong incentive to take the view, at least in public, that the party
has not been MAC’d by a materializing systematic risk, even if it in
fact has been. No negative information about the company is
released to third parties doing business with the company or to the
public generally. On the contrary, the counterparty, with its access
to inside information about the party, will have little choice but to
smile and declare that everything is on track for success after the
completion of the merger.268
MAC Conditions thus allocate to the counterparty certain kinds
of systematic risk because, even though neither party is likely to be
a cheaper cost avoider or superior bearer of such risk, allocating
systematic risks to the counterparty wholly eliminates the different
but related risk of harm to the party that would result if the
counterparty declared a MAC based on a purportedly materializing
systematic risk. Notice that this latter risk is in no way a systematic
risk. Though related to a systematic risk, it arises not from general
factors but from the fact that the acquisition process itself makes
the party vulnerable to the systematic risk in ways that it normally
is not. By temporally shifting the systematic risk to the counter-
party, this related risk arising from the process is reduced to zero.
This, I contend, is the real reason that MAC Conditions shift
systematic risks to the counterparty during the interim period.
At this point, someone may object that the argument proves too
much. That is, if I am right that it is almost always far worse to be
MAC’d and declared MAC’d than just to be MAC’d, then it would
seem that the counterparty is always the more efficient risk bearer
and so all deal risk should be allocated to counterparties and there
should be no MAC Conditions at all. This objection fails, however,
because the efficient allocation of risk depends on more than the
magnitude of the loss, and so the fact that the loss will be greater
for the party than the counterparty does not imply that the risk will
always be efficiently allocated to the counterparty. For example,
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some risks are preventable at a cost less than the expected cost of
their materialization, even when that expected cost varies because
different parties would suffer different losses if they bear the risk,
and for these risks the most efficient solution is to prevent the risk’s
materialization. Thus assume that being MAC’d and declared
MAC’d is twice as costly to the party than buying a MAC’d company
is to the counterparty (e.g., the loss to the party would be $2 billion
but the loss to the counterparty would be $1 billion), and assume
that the probability of the risk materializing is 1/10. Hence, the
expected cost of bearing the risk is $200 million to the party but
only $100 million to the counterparty. If, however, the party can
prevent the risk from materializing at a cost of $10 million, and the
counterparty cannot prevent the risk from materializing at all, then
the efficient solution is to assign the risk to the party, which will
then take precautions at a cost of $10 million, thus saving the
counterparty an expected cost of $100 million. Consequently, even
though the cost of being MAC’d and declared MAC’d is greater to
the party than the cost of buying a MAC’d company is to the
counterparty, deal risks that are preventable and for which the
party is the cheaper cost avoider (below I shall argue that most
business risks fit this bill) will nevertheless be efficiently allocated
to the party.
Again, even for some non-preventable risks, the efficient alloca-
tion of these risks depends not only on the magnitude of the loss but
also on the expected cost of the risk at the time of contracting and
so on parties’ estimations of the probability of the risk. If the party
has information superior to that of the counterparty that allows the
party to know the probability of the risk to be smaller than the
counterparty estimates it to be, then the party may be the superior
risk bearer even though the loss, if it materializes, will be greater
if it falls on the party than if it falls on the counterparty. For
example, assume again that, if the risk materializes, the loss to the
party would be $2 billion but the loss to the counterparty would be
$1 billion. Assume further, however, that the party estimates the
probability of the risk to be 1/100, but the counterparty, having
inferior information, estimates it to be 1/10. Then the expected cost
of bearing the risk will be $20 million to the party but $100 million
to the counterparty, and so efficiency demands that the risk be
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allocated to the party. Because parties will generally have better
information than counterparties about many aspects of their own
businesses, we should expect that, despite the fact that it is worse
to be MAC’d and declared MAC’d than just to be MAC’d, neverthe-
less some kinds of deal risk will be efficiently assigned to the party
itself rather than to the counterparty.269
Notice, however, that systematic risks are not like the risks in
these examples. For systematic risks, prevention is generally
impossible, and the parties, having generally similar information,
will also have similar probability estimates of the risk’s materializa-
tion. Neither party can do much to prevent a recession or a terrorist
attack, for example, and usually neither party has an advantage in
predicting whether such events will occur. For systematic risks,
therefore, the factor determining their efficient allocation may often
be the fact that the loss, if it occurs, will be greater if borne by the
party than by the counterparty.
The question then becomes why, in any particular merger agree-
ment, only some systematic risks are shifted to the counterparty.
The account given here can explain this. Given that the economic
function of shifting systematic risk is really to eliminate the
associated risk of a counterparty declaring a MAC on the basis of
such a systematic risk, what counts in determining which system-
atic risks to shift to the counterparty is nothing so much about the
risk itself but rather the danger, in the particular case, of a
counterparty declaring a MAC on the basis of such risk. This danger
will depend on such factors as the likelihood that the risk will really
materialize, the susceptibility of the party to damage from the
systematic risk itself if the risk materializes, the vulnerability of
the party to additional damage arising from its being declared
MAC’d on the basis of the risk, and the degree of opportunism the
counterparty is likely to demonstrate. These factors will vary
considerably from deal to deal, and so it is not surprising that MAC
Exceptions related to systematic risks vary considerably from
merger agreement to merger agreement.
For example, a general economic downturn will cause the
financial performance of most companies to suffer, and so most
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companies will have to worry that, if such a downturn occurs, their
counterparty could plausibly declare a MAC and inflict on it
additional damage. This is not true, however, for quite all compa-
nies, for some companies are generally countercyclical to the
economy as a whole, others are especially resistant to economic
downturns, and still others may not be particularly susceptible to
additional damage if declared MAC’d. Hence, we should expect
exactly what Table 1 in Part IV reveals: that most merger agree-
ments contain MAC Exceptions related to the economy generally
(for targets, 74 percent across all kinds of deals; for acquirers, 64
percent in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals taken together),
but not all such agreements do.270 Likewise, the class of companies
susceptible to damage on the basis of general factors less sweeping
than a general economic downturn—such as disruption of financial
markets, changes in law or GAAP, or acts of terrorism—although
certainly considerable, is not as large as the class of companies
vulnerable to a general economic downturn. We thus see again in
Table 1 what we would expect: that many, but by no means all of,
the MAC Definitions studied contain such exceptions (for targets, 54
percent for financial market conditions, 61 percent for law, 59
percent for GAAP, and 56 percent for terrorism, across all kinds of
deals; for acquirers, 43 percent for financial market conditions, 62
percent for law, 60 percent for GAAP, and 49 percent for terrorism
in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals taken together).271 It
would be easy to trace out similar patterns in the statistics reported
in Part IV.
2. Indicator Risks
The salient characteristic of indicator risks is that their material-
ization is not an adverse change in the business of the company but
rather only evidence of such a change. Thus, if a party fails to meet
its own internal earnings projections or similar estimates made by
industry analysts, or if its stock price drops, this does not necessar-
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ily mean that the party’s business has been materially adversely
affected, only that, for other reasons, it may be.272
As to financial projections and estimates, they are notoriously
difficult to make and so notoriously inaccurate. They are founded on
a tremendous number of assumptions, only the most salient of
which can be explicitly stated, and so it is only to be expected that
such projections or estimates will often not be met. Moreover, failing
to meet projections or estimates does not, without more, show that
there is anything wrong—much less materially adversely wrong—
with a party’s business. Failing to hit projections for a given quarter
may reflect no more than the timing of customer orders or account-
ing conventions regarding the booking of revenues.273 Even more,
sometimes internal projections are prepared not in an attempt to
predict actual results but for other purposes, such as to motivate
superior performance by employees.274 Failing to meet projections is
thus often fully consistent with the company’s experiencing very
healthy growth, let alone not suffering a MAC. But even when the
projections are intended to predict actual results (estimates of third-
party analysts, of course, are virtually always so intended), failing
to meet such projections is only evidence—and not especially
probative evidence at that—that something has gone wrong with the
business. 
Similarly, market prices of the company’s securities reflect the
market’s perceptions of the future value of the company based on
publicly available information. The company and its merger
partner, both of whom have access to much nonpublic information
about the company, are in a much better position than the market
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to determine the value of the company. It would be strange, indeed,
for them to have to look to the market to determine the value of the
company. In any case, a dramatic reduction in the trading prices of
the company’s securities at best proves that market participants
generally have concluded—presumably on the basis of other
information already in possession of the parties—that the com-
pany’s business has deteriorated.275
Now, whether a party meets the kinds of expectations at issue in
indicator risks is, obviously, more likely to be within the control of
the party than the counterparty during the period between signing
and closing. The party, of course, remains in control of its business
during this time. The party, therefore, would seem to be the cheaper
cost avoider with respect to indicator risks, and it is not surprising
that, by and large, indicator risks stay with the party itself. But, as
Table 1 in Part IV shows, MAC Conditions shift such risks to the
counterparty in a significant minority of deals.276 In cash deals,
indicator risks were shifted from targets to acquirers in 33 percent
of the agreements for projections risks, 34 percent of the agreements
for analyst estimates risks, and 30 percent of the agreements for
trading-prices risks.277 In stock-for-stock and cash-for-stock deals
taken together, such risks for targets were shifted to acquirers in 19
percent of the agreements (projections), 18 percent of the agree-
ments (estimates), and 23 percent of the agreements (trading
prices); for acquirers, they were shifted to targets in 17 percent of
the agreements (projections), 19 percent of the agreements (esti-
mates), and 30 percent of the agreements (trading prices).278 Given
that the party itself is likely to be the cheaper cost avoider with
respect to such risks, why would it ever be efficient to shift indicator
risks to the counterparty between signing and closing? 
The earlier discussion about the allocation of systematic risks
suggests an answer. Once again, the solution lies in realizing that
the acquisition process itself creates additional risks different from
but related to the risk being allocated in the MAC Exception. With
indicator risks, although the risk being allocated is the risk that a
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party will disappoint certain expectations, the acquisition process
creates an additional risk that a counterparty will use disappointed
expectations, either honestly or opportunistically, to declare a MAC.
Although failing to meet internal projections or analysts’ estimates
often shows little about the state of a party’s business, nevertheless
an argument that a party has been MAC’d on the basis of such a
failure can be seductively powerful. For example, in Genesco v.
Finish Line, even though the merger agreement at issue contained
a MAC Exception for failures to meet internal projections, in
holding that Genesco had suffered a MAC, the court referred again
and again to the fact that Genesco had missed these projections.279
Thus, a counterparty with buyer’s remorse could, with a certain
degree of plausibility, seize on the party’s failure to meet projections
and declare a MAC.280 Shifting indicator risks to the counterparty,
however, wholly eliminates that risk to the party. Moreover, the cost
to the counterparty of bearing indicator risks is relatively low. If
there really is a MAC on the party (as otherwise defined in the MAC
Definition), the counterparty can still declare it and exit the
transaction. All it loses is the ability to use certain evidence of
questionable probative value in arguing its case. The party itself,
meanwhile, is relieved of a serious risk.
Why, then, are indicator risks shifted only in a significant mi-
nority of agreements and not more often? The answer is that, unlike
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with systematic risks, indicator risks really do have a cheaper cost
avoider: the company itself. Hence, in determining whether it is
more efficient for the party or the counterparty to bear indicator
risks, there are significant costs and benefits to each possible
allocation. The party is the cheaper cost avoider for such risks,
which creates an efficiency in leaving the risk with the party, but
the party will be relieved of the related risk of being declared
MAC’d for disappointing expectations if the risk is shifted to the
counterparty, and this is also a real efficiency. The overall efficient
allocation of the risk thus depends on the relative magnitudes of
these efficiencies, and it is easy to imagine that in different cases
the balancing of costs and benefits will work out differently. If, at
signing, a party already knows that it is likely to miss internal
projections or existing analyst estimates, the latter efficiency may
outweigh the former, and the parties would agree to a MAC
Exception for indicator risks. If, on the other hand, the party is very
confident of hitting its projections and analyst estimates, it may not
bargain for such an exception. As appears from Table 1 in Part IV,
indicator risks are shifted to counterparties in only a significant
minority of the cases, and it would seem that usually, but not
always, the efficiency of placing the risk on the party outweighs the
efficiency of eliminating the risk of its being declared MAC’d for
disappointing expectations.281
Finally, it is worth noting that in deals involving stock, MAC
Exceptions related to trading prices of securities are more common:
for targets, 23 percent of stock-for-stock deals and 22 percent of
cash-and-stock deals, and for acquirers, 29 percent of stock-for-stock
deals and 31 percent of cash-and-stock deals. This, too, makes sense.
At least in the more common fixed exchange-ratio stock deals,
changes in the trading prices of a party’s shares immediately affect
the value of the deal to the counterparty, and so if the trading price
of a party’s shares declines, its counterparty will immediately find
the deal less attractive, giving it a special incentive to declare a
MAC even if no MAC has occurred. In other words, in such transac-
tions, there is a special likelihood of a counterparty declaring a MAC
on the basis of changes in trading prices, and this creates extra
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value to a party in being relieved of the risk related to declines in
such prices. Hence, MAC Exceptions for changes in trading prices
of the party’s securities are more common in such deals.
3. Agreement Risks
Agreement risks include all risks arising from the public an-
nouncement of the merger agreement and the taking of actions
contemplated thereunder by the parties.282 As I mentioned above in
Part III.A.1, agreement risks include the risks that Gilson and
Schwartz classified as endogenous in the Investment Theory: risks
arising from steps taken preclosing to prepare to integrate the
businesses of the parties postclosing, risks that employees will fear
that the merger will have adverse consequences for them personally
and will thus become distracted or seek alternative employment,
risks that customers may take their business elsewhere, risks that
competitors will exploit such situations to increase their market
share at the expense of the merging companies, and so on.283 Gilson
and Schwartz argued persuasively that the party itself is the
cheaper cost avoider with respect to such risks, but, in fact, we find
that such risks are very often shifted via a MAC Exception to the
counterparty (for targets, in 79 percent of cash deals, 69 percent of
stock-for-stock deals, and 76 percent of cash-and-stock deals; for
acquirers, in 69 percent of stock-for-stock deals and 73 percent of
cash-and-stock deals).284 This produces, in the stock-for-stock and
cash-and-stock deals, the kind of risk-swapping phenomenon we
saw above with respect to systematic risks. Why is it efficient for
parties to shift agreement risks to counterparties if the party itself
is the cheaper cost avoider for such risks?
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To begin with, recall that, even apart from the MAC Condition, a
party has significant protection against the counterparty’s agree-
ment risks. As explained in Part II.A, the typical ordinary course
covenant requires a party to take all reasonable steps to preserve its
business and goodwill, including its relationships with employees,
creditors, customers, and suppliers, and even prohibits various
actions and omissions that, although detrimental, would never
amount to MACs.285 Hence, little would be gained by leaving agree-
ment risks on the party itself; because of the interim covenants (and
for other reasons described in Part II.A), the party already has
strong incentives to prevent agreement risks from materializing and
to cushion those that do.
Furthermore, although the acquisition process undoubtedly dis-
rupts the party’s business in the ways that Gilson and Schwartz
say,286 merger-related disruptions, although important, are not
likely to MAC the business, at least if the party makes minimal
efforts to comply with its obligations under the interim covenants.
Indeed, if the parties thought that there was a realistic chance that
the contemplated transaction would destroy enough value to MAC
a party, they would very likely never enter into the transaction. If
the risk materialized, either the acquirer would walk away and the
target would be left with a destroyed business (if the MAC Condi-
tion allocated the risk to the target) or else the acquirer would have
to pay the full purchase price for a destroyed business (if the MAC
Condition allocated the risk to the acquirer). Transactions that
dangerous are rarely, if ever, undertaken. In the ordinary case,
although the parties know that the announcement of the transac-
tion and actions taken in connection with it will disrupt the
business of one or both parties, the parties also believe to a high
degree of certainty that these disruptions will not MAC the business
of either party.
In this context, we look once again for another risk, different
from, but related to, the risk being allocated in the MAC Exception,
that arises out of the acquisition process itself and that can be
eliminated via the MAC Exception. As with systematic risks and
indicator risks, if agreement risks are borne by the party itself and
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not the counterparty, then the party will also bear the risk that its
counterparty will point to the inevitable disruption in its business
arising from the acquisition process and declare a MAC in order to
renegotiate a lower price. Because some level of disruption in the
party’s business is highly foreseeable, and because the actual
disruption is not likely to MAC the business, a counterparty
declaring a MAC on the basis of materializing agreement risks is
likely to be behaving opportunistically. The risk to the party of such
opportunistic behavior can be wholly eliminated if agreement risks
are shifted to the counterparty. Because these factors—some
foreseeable level of disruption and a low probability of an actual
MAC as result thereof—are likely to obtain for companies entering
all kinds of business combinations, we see in Table 1 in Part IV
exactly what we would expect: MAC Exceptions for agreement risks
are very common in all kinds of deals:287 such exceptions appear in
the MAC Definitions applicable to targets in 79 percent of cash
deals and 73 percent of stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals,
and in 71 percent of the MAC Definitions applicable to acquirers in
stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals.288
4. Business Risks
This leaves, as the kinds of risk typically allocated by MAC
Conditions to the party itself, all risks other than those systematic,
indicator, and agreement risks shifted under MAC Exceptions. The
most obvious of these are the risks associated with the ordinary
business operations of the party—the kinds of negative events that,
in the ordinary course of operating the business, can be expected to
occur from time to time, including those that, although known, are
remote. In reported MAC litigations and in MAC disputes between
merger partners that have become public, the events to which
parties have in fact pointed when declaring MACs have often been
particularly severe adverse events of the kinds that can be expected
to occur in the party’s business—for example, loss of important
customers or sales due to competitive pressures,289 cyclical down-
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turns in the business,290 large tort liabilities arising from the
company’s operations,291 problems rolling out new information and
accounting systems,292 and product defects along with resulting
recalls and product liabilities claims.293 It is easy to imagine others:
price cutting by competitors that reduces margins in relevant
markets, infringements on key pieces of intellectual property (either
by competitors, thus reducing the company’s profitability, or by the
company, thus exposing it to liability), technological changes that
make the party’s products obsolete or less valuable to consumers,
shifts in consumer tastes and fashions, the introduction by competi-
tors of superior products at a lower price, and so on.294 Because
these risks associated with the ordinary operations of the business
seem to be the paradigm cases, I have called this class of risks
“business risks.”
The idea that parties paradigmatically intend to assign to the
party itself the risks associated with the party’s business as
conducted in the ordinary course meshes nicely with the earlier
treatment of systematic risks, indicator risks, and agreement
risks.295 The efficient allocation of these classes of risk depended in
significant part on the existence of the acquisition process itself. If
business risks are risks not arising from the acquisition process,
then the division of risks in the typical MAC Definition is based on
an intelligible principle: special risks to the party’s business arising
from the acquisition process and potential actions in connection
therewith by the counterparty can be reduced or eliminated by
shifting those risks to the counterparty, but risks inherent in the
business operations of the party in the ordinary course can be more
efficiently borne by that party itself.
Indeed, it should be obvious that the risks inherent in the
ordinary operations of a party’s business are more efficiently borne
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filed other than as exhibits to Forms 8-K.
by that party than by the counterparty. With respect to such risks,
the party itself is better placed to prevent such risks (i.e., is the
cheaper cost avoider) and has superior knowledge about the
likelihood of the materializations of such risks that cannot be
prevented (i.e., is the superior risk bearer). It would be ludicrous to
suggest, for example, that the counterparty would be a cheaper risk
avoider or superior risk bearer with respect to, say, design or
manufacturing defects in the party’s products or with respect to
hidden liabilities resulting from the party’s operations long ago.
Hence, efficient MAC Conditions will allocate such risks to the party
itself, and this is exactly what, in fact, we find.
IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS ON MAC DEFINITIONS IN 353 RECENT
AGREEMENTS
Under applicable provisions of the federal securities laws, when
a company subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 enters into a definitive material
agreement, including a definitive business combination agreement,
it is required within four business days to report the event on a
Form 8-K.296 Although not required to file the agreement itself as an
exhibit thereto, the SEC encourages filers to do so,297 and companies
filing Forms 8-K related to business combination agreements
routinely do include the agreements themselves as exhibits. To
obtain a large sample of MAC Definitions, my research assistants
and I downloaded from EDGAR all 939 material agreements
included as exhibits to Forms 8-K filed between July 1, 2007, and
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298. As noted above in note 112, merger agreements in some cash deals contain a definition
of “material adverse change” or “material adverse effect” applicable to the acquirer but
referring not to the business or financial condition of the acquirer but merely to its ability to
consummate the transaction. Since such definitions are not attempting to capture the same
kinds of changes generally at stake in MAC Definitions, they share none of the structure
typical of MAC Definitions (e.g., MAC Objects and MAC Exceptions), and so we did not
include such definitions in our sample.
299. In some such deals, there was a definition of MAC applicable to the acquirer that
referred not to the acquirer’s business or financial condition but only to its ability to
consummate the transaction. As with the similar definitions appearing in some cash deals,
see supra note 298, we did not include such definitions in the sample and treated such deals
as if there was no definition of MAC applicable to the acquirer.
June 30, 2008, and containing the phrase “material adverse change”
or “material adverse effect.” After eliminating duplicates, amend-
ments to previously filed agreements, agreements not related to
business combination transactions, and agreements in which
“material adverse change” or “material adverse effect” was not fur-
ther defined, we obtained a sample of 353 business combination
agreements containing MAC Definitions. We then classified these
353 agreements on the basis of the form of consideration being
offered as cash deals (198 agreements), stock-for-stock deals (70
agreements), and cash-and-stock deals (85 agreements).
For each agreement, we examined the definition or definitions of
MAC used in the agreement. That is, for cash deals, we examined
the definition of MAC as such term was applied to the target (MAC
on TAR, in the tables below),298 and in stock-for-stock and cash-and-
stock deals, we looked at both of the MAC Definitions, specifically,
the definition of MAC as applied to the target (MAC on TAR) and
the definition of MAC as applied to the acquirer (MAC on ACQ). In
those stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals in which the
agreement contained but one definition applicable to both parties to
the transaction, we counted such definition as appearing twice,
specifically, once as a definition of MAC on TAR and once as a
definition of MAC on ACQ, thus obtaining a total of 492 MAC
Definitions across all kinds of deals in the aggregate. In a relatively
small percentage of both stock-for-stock deals (eight of 70 agree-
ments) and cash-and-stock deals (eight of 85 agreements), there was
a MAC Definition applicable to the target but no MAC Definition
applicable to the acquirer.299 Thus, in some of the tables below, the
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columns for data related to MAC on ACQ contain data for only 62
stock-for-stock deals and only 77 cash-and-stock deals.
In order to analyze the definitions, we established classification
systems for MAC Objects and for MAC Exceptions as follows. For
MAC Objects, we adopted the following classification and abbrevia-
tions:
Abbreviation MAC Object
   BUS Business
   FIN-CON Financial Condition
   RES-OPS Results of Operations
   ASSETS Assets
   LIABS Liabilities
   PROPS Properties
   CON Condition (Other Than Financial
Condition)
   OPS Operations
   CAP Capitalization
   PROSP Prospects
Besides the MAC Objects listed above, we found in the sample a few
other unusual MAC Objects that we have not classified and reported
in the tables below. Leaving aside MAC Objects obviously specific
to particular transactions, the unusual MAC Objects not classified
and reported included the following: relations with customers (nine
deals), relations with employees or labor unions (eight deals),
relations with suppliers (five deals), and intellectual property (three
deals).
MAC Exceptions are somewhat less susceptible of precise
classification than are MAC Objects. For, although the parties
negotiating a business combination agreement will, generally
speaking, need only agree in haec verba on which items from the
above list of generally used MAC Objects to include in the definition
in their particular agreement, nevertheless the exact wording of
MAC Exceptions, even ones that lawyers would generally think of
as being legally equivalent, will vary from agreement to agreement.
Hence, in placing particular MAC Exceptions into one of our
categories, we sometimes had to exercise some legal judgment as to
whether the exception ought be classed with others under a
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particular heading. Even so, there is a tremendous degree of
uniformity across agreements in the phrasing of MAC Exceptions.
In the following classification system, in a large percentage of the
cases, the definitions of the MAC Exceptions given below track
verbatim or nearly so the language in the agreements we have
reported as having such MAC Exceptions. In addition, in our
judgment, all the agreements so reported contain language that a
court would likely find to be synonymous with the definitions we
give below.
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Abbreviation Intended Coverage of MAC Exception
   ECO General changes in the economy or economic or
business conditions
   MARK General changes in conditions in financial, credit,
debt, capital, or securities markets
   INDUS General changes in the industries or lines of busi-
ness in which the party operates
   LAW General changes in law or legal regulations
   GAAP General changes in generally accepted accounting
principles or other accounting matters
   POL General changes in political or social conditions
   WAR Acts of war or the outbreak or escalation of hostili-
ties
   TERR Acts of terrorism
   NATDIS Natural disasters or acts of God, including hurri-
canes, earthquakes, and tornadoes
   PROJ Failures to meet financial projections prepared by
the party itself (but not the underlying causes of any
such failures)
   ESTIM Failures to meet financial estimates prepared by
industry analysts or other third parties (but not the
underlying causes of any such failures)
   PRICES Changes in the prices or trading volume of the
party’s own securities (but not the underlying causes
of any such changes)
   AGMT Changes arising from the public announcement of
the business combination agreement or the taking of
any actions contemplated thereby or to which the
counterparty consents
Besides the MAC Exceptions listed above, we found in the sample
a few other unusual MAC Exceptions that we have not classified
and reported in the tables below. Leaving aside MAC Exceptions
obviously specific to particular transactions, the unusual MAC
Exceptions not reported in the tables below included changes
arising from seasonality or seasonal conditions (seven deals) and
downgrades in a party’s credit rating or the ratings of the party’s
debt securities (three deals).
In addition, in order to indicate the presence of a
Disproportionality Exclusion related to a MAC Exception, we write
2096 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2007
“-D” after the relevant abbreviation. Thus “ECO-D” indicates a MAC
Exception for ECO qualified by a Disproportionality Exclusion.
Table 1 below sets out the frequency of the various MAC Objects
and MAC Exceptions, by deal type as found in the sample, and also
presents aggregate data for all deals involving stock (i.e., grouping
together stock-for-stock deals and cash-and-stock deals), all MAC
Definitions applicable to targets (i.e., all MAC on TAR definitions,
regardless of deal type), and all MAC Definitions generally (i.e., all
MAC on TAR definitions in cash deals, and all MAC on TAR and
MAC on ACQ definitions in stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals
together). For stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock deals, the data
presented reflect the MAC on TAR definitions in all such deals (i.e.,
70 stock-for-stock deals and 85 cash-and-stock deals) and the MAC
on ACQ definitions in those deals in which there were definitions of
MAC applicable to the acquirer (i.e., 62 stock-for-stock deals and 77
cash-and-stock deals).
For those MAC Exceptions that can be qualified by
Disproportionality Exclusions (ECO, MARK, INDUS, LAW, GAAP,
POL, WAR, TERR, and NATDIS), the rows related to such excep-
tions indicate, separated by a slash, both the percentages of
agreements having such a MAC Exception (whether or not qualified
by such an exclusion) and the percentage of agreements having such
a MAC Exception that are qualified by a Disproportionality
Exclusion. For example, in Table 1, in the column for cash deals, the
ECO/-D row contains .81/.62. The first number indicates that 81
percent of the cash deals studied contain a MAC Exception for
general economic changes, whether qualified by a Disproportionality
Exclusion or not. The second number indicates that 62 percent of
the cash deals studied contain a MAC Exception for general eco-
nomic changes that was qualified by a Disproportionality Exclusion.
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Table 1. Frequency of MAC Objects and MAC Exceptions
(With Disproportionality Exclusions) by Deal Type


























































   BUS .86 .97 .95 .93 .94 .95 .94 .90 .91
   FIN-CON .97 .97 .97 .99 .99 .98 .98 .98 .98
   RES-OPS .86 .80 .79 .89 .87 .85 .83 .86 .85
   ASSETS .77 .66 .68 .62 .61 .64 .64 .71 .69
   LIABS .46 .37 .40 .35 .36 .36 .38 .42 .41
   PROPS .27 .33 .32 .28 .31 .30 .32 .28 .29
   CON .39 .40 .37 .20 .19 .29 .27 .35 .33
   OPS .28 .30 .26 .26 .26 .28 .26 .28 .27
   CAP .09 .09 .10 .04 .05 .06 .07 .07 .07
   PROSP .17 .24 .26 .15 .16 .19 .20 .18 .19
  Exceptions:
ECO/-D .81/.62 .70/.37 .69/.34 .62/.39 .60/.40 .66/.38 .64/.37 .74/.51 .71/.47
MARK/-D .61/.44 .46/.26 .44/.26 .45/.25 .43/.26 .45/.25 .43/.26 .54/.36 .51/.33
INDUS/-D .77/.63 .56/.43 .53/.39 .68/.51 .68/.51 .63/.47 .61/.45 .71/.56 .68/.53
LAW/-D .62/.28 .57/.23 .58/.19 .64/.22 .65/.25 .61/.23 .62/.22 .61/.26 .61/.25
GAAP/-D .60/.21 .47/.21 .50/.19 .66/.19 .68/.21 .57/.20 .60/.20 .59/.20 .59/.20
POL/-D .39/.27 .44/.21 .44/.19 .31/.25 .31/.26 .37/.23 .37/.23 .38/.25 .38/.25
WAR/-D .63/.39 .47/.21 .45/.19 .52/.26 .52/.27 .50/.24 .49/.24 .57/.32 .55/.30
TERR/-D .62/.38 .47/.21 .45/.19 .49/.25 .52/.27 .48/.23 .49/.24 .56/.32 .54/.29
NATDIS/-D .30/.20 .20/.07 .16/.06 .20/.12 .19/.13 .20/.10 .18/.10 .26/.16 .24/.14
PROJ .33 .14 .15 .24 .19 .19 .17 .27 .24
ESTIM .34 .19 .19 .18 .18 .18 .19 .27 .25
PRICES .30 .23 .29 .22 .31 .23 .30 .27 .28
AGMT .79 .69 .69 .76 .73 .73 .71 .76 .75
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We next compared the definitions of MAC on TAR and MAC on
ACQ in those stock-for-stock deals and cash-and-stock deals in
which there were MAC Definitions applicable to both the target and
the acquirer. As noted above, this is the large majority of both
classes of deals (62 of 70 stock-for-stock deals and 77 of 85 cash-and-
stock deals). As noted below in Table 2, when there are definitions
of both MAC on TAR and MAC on ACQ, the definitions are virtually
always reciprocal.
Table 2. Comparison of MAC Definitions 
in Stock-for-Stock andCash-and-Stock Deals with 
MAC Definitions Applicable to Targets and Acquirers














  Reciprocal 
  MAC Definitions: .98 .97 .98
  Non-Reciprocal 
  MAC Definitions: .02 .03 .02
Even when those deals in which there is no definition of MAC
applicable to the acquirer are factored in and treated as being non-
reciprocal, the large majority of deals are still reciprocal. Table 3
below presents data for all stock-for-stock deals and all cash-and-
stock deals in the sample, regardless of whether they include a
definition of MAC on ACQ.
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Table 3. Comparison of MAC Definitions 
in All Stock-for-Stock and Cash-and-Stock Deals














  MAC Definitions: .87 .88 .88
 
  No Definition of  
  MAC on ACQ: .11  .09 .10
  Non-Reciprocal 
  MAC Definitions: .02 .03 .02
In an effort to discover any relationship between the MAC
Exceptions in the definitions of MAC applicable to targets and the
MAC Exceptions in the definitions of MAC applicable to acquirers
in those stock-for-stock deals (62 deals) and cash-and-stock deals (77
deals) including MAC definitions for both parties, we next took all
deals in which a given MAC Exception appeared in the definition of
MAC on ACQ (the horizontal rows) and determined the percentage
of such deals in which the definition of MAC on TAR had each of the
classified MAC Exceptions (the vertical columns). For example, in
Table 4 below, in the row for ECO and the column for MARK, the
number .62 indicates that, in those deals in which the definition of
MAC on ACQ included a MAC Exception for ECO, 62 percent of the
definitions of MAC on TAR included a MAC Exception for MARK.
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Table 4. Relation of MAC Exceptions in MAC Definitions 
in Stock-for-Stock and Cash-and-Stock Deals:
MAC Exceptions for Targets (Vertical) by 
MAC Exceptions for Acquirer (Horizontal)
(Percentages Expressed in Two-Digit Decimal Notation)



























































ECO 1.0 .62 .78 .71 .67 .52 .61 .61 .22 .27 .27 .31 .87
MARK .92 1.0 .77 .82 .80 .63 .75 .75 .27 .37 .38 .45 .95
INDUS .84 .55 .99 .78 .76 .42 .64 .64 .25 .26 .26 .35 .91
LAW .76 .58 .78 1.0 .92 .55 .73 .73 .28 .26 .27 .36 .95
GAAP .75 .59 .80 .95 1.0 .52 .73 .73 .28 .30 .29 .36 .95
POL .92 .75 .73 .92 .84 1.0 .80 .80 .29 .35 .33 .43 .96
WAR .82 .68 .81 .93 .90 .60 1.0 1.0 .35 .29 .32 .41 .97
TERR .82 .68 .81 .93 .90 .60 1.0 1.0 .35 .29 .32 .41 .97
NATDIS .84 .64 .84 .96 .92 .60 .96 .96 1.0 .40 .40 .56 1.0
PROJ .96 .83 .88 .83 .96 .67 .75 .75 .42 1.0 .88 .71 .96
ESTIM .92 .88 .88 .88 .92 .65 .85 .85 .38 .85 .96 .81 .96
PRICES .86 .76 .83 .88 .86 .55 .76 .76 .33 .43 .50 .81 .88
AGMT .78 .58 .75 .80 .77 .49 .65 .65 .25 .25 .25 .31 1.0
Conversely, for the same group of deals, we then took all deals in
which a given MAC Exception appeared in the definition of MAC on
TAR (the horizontal rows) and determined the percentage of such
deals in which the definition of MAC on ACQ had each of the
classified MAC Exceptions (the vertical columns). For example, in
2009] THE ECONOMICS OF DEAL RISK 2101
Table 5 below, in the row for INDUS and the column for ECO, the
number .79 indicates that, in those deals in which the definition of
MAC on TAR included a MAC Exception for INDUS, 71 percent of
the definitions of MAC on ACQ included a MAC Exception for ECO.
Table 5. Relation of MAC Exceptions in MAC Definitions
in Stock-for-Stock and Cash-and-Stock Deals:
 MAC Exceptions for Acquirers (Vertical) by 
MAC Exceptions for Targets (Horizontal)
(Percentages Expressed in Two-Digit Decimal Notation)



























































ECO .96 .59 .76 .70 .67 .51 .60 .60 .23 .25 .26 .39 .83
MARK .89 .97 .76 .81 .79 .61 .74 .74 .26 .32 .37 .52 .92
INDUS .79 .53 .97 .77 .76 .43 .63 .63 .24 .24 .26 .40 .85
LAW .72 .56 .76 .99 .91 .54 .72 .72 .28 .23 .26 .43 .91
GAAP .72 .58 .78 .95 1.0 .52 .73 .73 .28 .28 .29 .43 .92
POL .90 .75 .71 .92 .84 1.0 .80 .80 .29 .31 .33 .45 .96
WAR .78 .65 .78 .91 .88 .59 .99 .99 .35 .26 .32 .46 .93
TERR .78 .65 .78 .91 .88 .59 .99 .99 .35 .26 .32 .46 .93
NATDIS .80 .64 .84 .96 .92 .60 .96 .96 1.0 .40 .40 .56 1.0
PROJ .92 .85 .85 .85 .96 .69 .77 .77 .38 .92 .85 .69 .96
ESTIM .92 .88 .85 .88 .92 .65 .85 .85 .38 .81 .96 .81 .96
PRICES .80 .77 .86 .89 .86 .63 .80 .80 .40 .49 .60 .97 .89
AGMT .74 .55 .74 .79 .76 .47 .63 .63 .24 .22 .24 .36 .95
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300. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 346; see also supra Part III.A.2.
301. See supra Part III.A.1.
302. See supra Part III.A.2.
303. See supra Part I.C.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
A theme runs through many of the arguments in this Article:
Business combination transactions are so varied and complex that
many of the academic theories about such transactions have
oversimplified the phenomena to the point that the theories can be
easily falsified by a whole class of business combination transac-
tions. The principal example of such oversimplification was the
assumption made by Gilson and Schwartz that in all business
combination transactions involving MAC Conditions, the parties
have disparate economic interests, with one party being the buyer
and the other being the seller—an assumption clearly untrue in the
case of stock-for-stock and cash-and-stock mergers.300 There were
lesser examples as well. The Symmetry Theory assumed that
targets always have the right to exit a business combination
agreement to accept a superior offer from a third party.301 This is
false in transactions in which the shareholders of the target are
sufficiently few that transactions costs do not prevent making them
parties to the agreement. Or again, Gilson and Schwartz proposed
what seemed to be a plausible explanation of why risks arising from
the announcement of a merger agreement should be allocated to the
target,302 but, in fact MAC Definitions usually shift such risks to the
acquirer. Similarly, any number of practitioners and scholars have
said that Revlon and Omnicare in effect create put options in favor
of the target,303 but the reality is that the target’s shareholder vote
already created that option; Revlon and Omnicare just affect when
and by whom the put option is likely to be exercised.
There is no remedy for such falsifiable oversimplifications except
a detailed knowledge of how transactions actually work. That
knowledge, unfortunately, can be hard to come by in academia.
Even when agreements and other deal documents are publicly filed,
they often do not tell the whole story. In many cases, there is no
good substitute for actually participating in the process of
dealmaking. Practitioners, of course, have the relevant knowledge,
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and so, perhaps, a solution lies in fostering closer ties between
academics and the lawyers of the corporate bar. No doubt this is
easier said than done.
Finally, what I take to be the primary theoretical contribution of
this Article to the economic analysis of contracts also flows from the
complexity of business combination transactions. It has long been
recognized that, when one party is a cheaper cost avoider or a
superior risk bearer of a certain risk, contracts will tend to shift that
risk to the relevant party. This Article identifies another reason for
shifting risks between parties. In particular, some of the risks that
a party bears going into a transaction are such that neither party is
a cheaper cost avoider or a superior risk bearer with respect to such
risks. Although prior theory would suggest that efficiency requires
leaving such risks where they lie (because there are transaction
costs to shifting the risks and nothing to be gained from so doing),
in business combination transactions, leaving risks where they lie
may generate additional risks that can be reduced or wholly
eliminated if the underlying risks are shifted to the counterparty.
There is no reason to believe that this principle is limited to
business combinations. In all likelihood, it is at work in a wide
variety of complex commercial transactions, and a fuller under-
standing of the rationality of risk allocations in such transactions
requires further investigation of this principle.
